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INTRODUCTION 
The words federation, federal, fededralism, have their 
origin from the Latin term "foedus", which means: alliance, 
association, compact, contract, league, treaty, trust, 
union. 
The federal idea flourishing in this world from ancient 
times. It is claimed that the ancient Israelites, around 
13th century B.C., applied some sort of a federal principle 
to maintain unity of their several tribes. There are 
records of the ancient Chinese in the 6th century B.C., who 
worked out a federal arrangement to ward-Off foreign 
invasions. Accounts are available of the ancient Indian 
Vajjian confederacy and the vaisali-federal arrangement of 
the Licchavi tribes, with a republican constitution. 
The medieval unions of Western and northern Europe 
evolved varied patterns of federal arrangements. Switzerland 
is the classic experience of fderalism which has been the 
oldest continuing federal system in the world. It's origin 
can be traced to 1291, when the cantons in the Alps, formed 
a defensive alliance, for the first time. 
The communities seeking neighbourly contacts were 
usually urban, partly no doubt because they had more to 
defend, and also because their trade contacts spread failry 
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wide. But these settlements were not always urban. The 
three founding cantons of the Swiss confederation were most 
definitely rural, but their location in deeply separated 
mountain valleys encouraged a de9,ling of community. 
However, its ©J^ dgin can be traced to 1219, when the 
three cantons in the Alps, formed a defensive alliance, and 
the land for the first time came to be known as Switzerland. 
It then evolved into a Swiss League in 1315, subsequently 
expanding with the inclusion of Lucerne in 1332, Zurich in 
1315, and of Fribourg and Soleure after the war with 
Burgundy in 1740. The treaty of Basle, 1499, provided a 
practical recognition to Swiss independence, and the Swiss 
League further increased its territory by the addition of 
Basle and Schaffhausen in 1501, and of the north-eastern 
canton of Appenzel in 1513. The Helvetic Republic was 
estabilished in 1798. Then the federal pact was entered 
into by all the 22 cantons, and the present Swiss 
constitution was adopted in 1849. 
The experiences of these early Swiss throws light on 
the origin of federation from which the requisites of 
federatism can be more easily derived, with this in mind 
have chapter -I contains a brief servey of some classical 
federations such as those of Switzerland, U.S.A., Canada, 
Australia, and USSR. 
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The end of the British colonial rule in its North 
American colonies, in the last quarter of the 18th century 
gave rise to the first modern federal democratic state. 
United States of America, after the Declaration of American 
Independence in 1776, and the adoption of the constitution 
in 1787, the federal ideal gained worldwide recognition. 
The vigorous demand for autonomy within the British 
commonwealth resulted in the establishment of federal 
systems in Canada and Australia. The withdrawal of the 
Spanish-Portuguese overlordship in Latin America brought 
into being four large federal states. The collapse of 
Czarist Russian Empire in the first quarter of the 20th 
centurey led to the formation of the multi-national 
federation of the USSR. 
The liquidation of British imperialism in the mid-
twentieth century gave rise to the establishment of two 
large federal states like India and Pakistan. 
The American federal system of government was not 
invented by the framers of the constitutiuon at the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787. It was the result of long 
experience, ideas from many sources, and the urgencies of 
the time.^ 
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Federations are the product of certain geographical and 
historical factors and also a will to unite. In the United 
States, all the three factors were present. The thirteen 
states which originally formed the federal union covered a 
vast area which has since grown into continental proportion. 
The thirteen former colonies of the U.S.A. had passed 
through a period of sovereign statehood before decided to 
merge themselves in a federal union.^ 
It is necessary to remember that none of the thirteen 
states was prepared to make a complete abdication of its 
sovereignty and that each was determined to maintain its 
political entity. Union was desired, so was state autonomy. 
The principal task before the constitution-makers was to 
create a national government, powerful enough to steer clear 
of the dangers which beset the old confederation (1781-87) 
but not so powerful as to be able to crush the states. The 
result was that they gave the national government large but 
not unlimited powers. Thus, they tried to provide the 
central government adequate revenues but not unlimited power 
to tax. They authorised it to regulate foreign and inter-
state commerce, but they forbade it to interfere with 
commerce within each state. They empowered it to maintain 
armed forces and, at the same time, left each state free to 
have its own militia. In short, the national government was 
given specified and delegated powers. The constitution was 
framed on the principle that the central government would 
exercise only such powers as were "enumerated* in it, or as 
the enumerated power. 
Australia must be counted as one of world's most 
successful federations. It has changed its character in many 
ways since its foundation in 1901, but the changes have been 
accomplished by negotiation and a willingness to compromise, 
so that no violent measures were required. By the time the 
federation was established all six had attained a measure of 
democratic self-government. New South Wales and Victoria had 
their own constitution from 1855. Tasmania and south 
Australia followed in 1856, and Queensland in 1859. But West 
Australia, was remote and poor even after the gold 
adventure. It did not acquire self-government until 1890. 
From the beginning New South Wales and Victoria were the 
most developed, the most thickly populated (or least 
sparsely) and so they have remained, till today. 
The first step in the directon of federation was a 
National Convention held in Sydney in 1891. At this meeting 
federal principle was approved.-" Australia was to be a 
Dominion, like Canada, with a Governor- General representing 
the British Sovereign, having a duty to report to the Privy 
Council any drastic change or difficulty. 
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The second important aspect of the Australian 
federation is that it has adopted the British model of 
Cabinet government. Ministers being Member of Parliament and 
responsible to it, thus fundamentally different from the 
American system where the Cabinet is appointed by the 
president and is responsible to him.'* 
Thirdly the Australian have borrowed from the swiss the 
use of the referendum. Finally, but quite fundamentally, 
residual powers in the federation belong to the states. 
Australia is essentially a federation by aggregation and -. 
th^e different colonies becoming states had launched a 
variety of activities even before federation was discussed. 
Initially, thus the federal government was relatively weak. 
The state were the givers, not receivers. The constitution 
conformed in a manner to the classic image of a federation 
with each level of government supreme and independent within 
its own sphere. This was clearly demarcated in the 
constitution. The course of Australian constitutional 
arrangement can be considered as a gradual transition from 
the predominant power residing in the states to a central 
authority. 
The first definite step towards federation was the 
adoption of the Quebec Resolutions in 1864 by a Conference 
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of delegates from Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
These resolution recorded the resolve to build the new 
federal structure upon a model of the British constitution. 
The following year this determination was confirmed by the 
French-speaking Canadians of lower Canada who declarated 
that the proposed federation should remain a "British 
Colony" in which they had secured equal rights and 
parliamentary democracy. 
The Quebec Resolutions were adopted in province of 
Canada but rejected, by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, so 
much so that in 1865 Tilley lost election in New Brunswick 
as a supporter of federation. 
The New Constitution was framed at the Westminister 
Conference in 1866. The American device of residual powers 
to the States was rejected because it had helped bring in 
the American Civil war. Another reason being threat from 
U.S.A. The federal government had the same parliamentary 
form and the same degree of responsible government as the 
colonies that composed it, and it was based on the Durham 
Report. 
The original federation consisted of Ontario and Quebec 
(as the two parts of the former United Province were now 
called), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Monitoba was 
constituted a province in 1870 and British Colvimbia (still 
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without railway contact with the east) in 1871; province 
Edward Island in 1873; Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905. New 
foundland become the tenth province in 1959. The background 
of Canadian federation was different from the other the 
federation of U.S.A. or Australia. The urge was more 
internal then external, but there was both an internal and 
external reason for the features Canadian federation 
assumed. 
The principle of the distribution of powers under the 
Canadian system is, the antithesis of the United States. In 
Canada the powers of the provinces are enumerated, the 
"reserve of powers" being left with the federation. Though 
a list of powers of the States is given in the original Act 
of 1867, this is only for the sake of greater clarity and 
not to diminish the federal power. The grant of powers to 
the provinces is considerable, including such matters, as 
the amendment of their own constitutions (except that it may 
not abolish the office of Leiutenant Governor), direct 
taxation within the province, the administration of Justice, 
and the control of municipal government within the province. 
A key factor in the formulation of federation is .the 
growth of national consciousness among the people crossing 
over their own small polities. Nationalism, throughout 
recent history, can be observed as the prime mover of 
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federations. But such nationalism cannot be close, monolith 
or static. It reflects a psyche involving both unity and 
diversity. There are many other factors to support -and 
uphold it. At the highest level, it culminates into a new 
sovereign state which by its nature allows its pre-existing 
diversities and primordialties to grow further.^ 
The classical statement of pre-requisites of federalism 
is found in Dicey who held that they are "contiguity' 
referred to as 'federal sentiment. K.C. Wheare has outlined 
some of the conditions of federalism as,^ 
1. A sense of military insecurity and the need for common 
defence, 
2. A desire to be independent of foreign powers, for which 
the union is necessary. 
3. A hope of economic advantage. 
4. Some previous political association. 
5. Geographical neighbourhood, and 
6. Similarity of political institutions. 
Federal governments are the product of economic and 
social pressures. Federalism, as a form of political 
organisation, has nowhere been adopted on theoretical 
grounds of its real or hypothetical virtues. On the 
contrary, it has always emerged as a product of compromise 
and expediency. The USSR where the communists have a 
monolithic state system in which power was concentrated at 
the top in accordance with the principle of democratic 
centralization, the constitution has sought to make a 
compromise with the diversified, polyglot Russian empire by 
putting up a facade of "Voluntary" federalism. It gave, on 
paper a remarkable measure of autonomy to the constituent 
units. 
Therefore, the theories of federation come into 
existence after the formation of the Swiss & American 
federations. The federation were not based on these 
theories. It was the structured and functional aspects of 
these federations which become the basis of almost all these 
theories. Take for example, the requisite of the federation 
like contiguas area, common history, common enemies, common 
experience, and common culture are listed as the requisite 
by federal theorist which existed much earlier ' in 
Switzerland then the theory of requisite itself. 
Ever since the Royal proclamation of 1858 Indian 
politicians had little thought of the definite form of the 
future and the ultimate constitution of India. The various 
Act of 1861, 1892, 1909 had not clearly indicated it. In 
fact, the problem had been shelved. When the Indian National 
Congress was formed in 1885 its programme was vague and 
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consisted of piecemeal reforms like the separation of 
executive and judicial functions, appointment of more 
Indians to higher services and such other generalisations as 
the introduction of representatives institutions and so 
forth. It was for the first time in 1906 that the late Mr. 
Dadabhoy Naoroji as President of the Calcutta Congress, in 
his presidential address defined the goal of India as self-
government; even then the term was not clearly explained. 
Not even the anarchist parties could clearly define their 
aim beyond that of driving the British out of India. The 
Government, too defined their ultimate goal in the 
Announcement of August 20, 1917, as full responsible 
government. At the Round Table Conference in London and 
subsequently in the British parliament, all the three 
British political parties accepted India's future status to 
be the same as that of other self-governing dominions. 
The Madras Congress of December 1927 passed the famous 
Independence Resolution which fixed complete independence 
out of the British Empire as India's goal, but it did not 
throw any light on the precise nature of the future 
constitution, as it was thought inexpedient to open the 
question before the independence was achieved/ 
Lord Birkenhead, who at that time was at the head of 
India office in London, threw a challenge to Indian 
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p o l i t i c i a n s t o produce an agreed c o n s t i t u t i o n . In response 
to t h i s the Congress and the Liberal Federation called an 
Al l P a r t i e s Conference a t Bombay in May 1928, which 
appointed a sub-conunittee under the Chairmanship of the 
Swarajist leader , the l a t e Pandit Moti la l Nehru, and with 
such d is t inguished lawyers and ex-members of the Viceroy's 
Executive Council as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sir Ali Imam. 
This committee a f te r several s i t t i n g s placed before the 
country i t s r epor t , popularly known as the Nehru Report, 
which con t a ined the o u t l i n e s of a d r a f t of a federa l 
cons t i t u t ion for India. 
As an i n e v i t a b l e concomitant t o t h e dec i s ion of 
introducing responsible government in India , Br i t i sh policy 
a f t e r 1919 s h i f t e d in favour of t h e c r e a t i o n of a 
federa t ion . Under the Act of 1919, while the system of 
government remained b a s i c a l l y u n i t a r y , "outward 
paraphernal ia of a federal organization were c rea ted ' , 
and India was placed on the road of to f e d e r a l i s m ' . ' 
While the Br i t i sh Government persued decentra l iza t ion, 
" to t u r n t h e a t t e n t i o n of the people from the h ighes t 
f o r t r e s s t o t h e l e s s important p r o v i n c i a l pos t s and to 
d ive r t popular energy in capturing them", the Indian leaders 
welcomed i t as a way of securing p o l i t i c a l reforms^pj From 
the Br i t i sh point of view, the process of democratization by 
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instalments enabled the British to establish some sort of 
federal structure in India. In grained in this policy of 
reforms by instalments and through decentralization was the 
concept of a federation. That in the case of India, the 
creation of semi-autonomous constituent units to forge a 
federation was primarily ir.otivated by colonial 
considerations. It might also be an offshoot of Tory policy 
of divide and rule.^ In the light of British colonial 
policy in India, it can be inferred that the British 
colonial tradition had some traits which were especially 
conducive to the federal form. 
The policy of linking democratization to federalism 
encouraged dissension and confrontation by inspiring forces 
of regionalism and complicated the entire question of 
constitutional reforms by compounding it with the problems 
of princely states and minorities. 
While there were hardly any Indians who had given 
serious thought to federalism before the Mont-Ford Reform, 
ideas on federalism began to crystallise soon after the 
principle was accepted on a limited scale under the 
Government of India Act, 1919. According to Professor N.C. 
Roy, there were only three outstanding men, namely Mr. 
Vijaya Raghavachariar, Mr. K. Natrajan, and Sir P.S. 
Sivaswamy Aiyer, who came out with their pronounced 
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opposition to the federal principle for India. Through, 
cognitive affective and evaluative orientation process 
federalism was fast becoming a part of India's political 
culture and thus a certainty for the future form of India's 
constitution. 
In attempting to accommodate the concept of responsible 
government in ten provinces within the specifications of 
their federal design - wherein the centre was to remain in 
real control and authority over the provinces - the British 
created a federal pattern which combined the parliamentary 
system and was, therefore, quite different to the classic 
federal form of the U.S.A. The Indian version of federalism 
- providing for a strong centre and combining with the 
parliamentary pattern - initiated by the Act of 1919,^^ 
became a part of Indian political concensus in the Nehru 
Report and a constitutional reality under the Act of 1935. 
The federal structure of 1935 profoundly influenced 
India's choice of constitution after freedom, and led to the 
adoption, by the Constituent Assembly, of a 'Cooperative 
federation'^^ with a strong central government. In effect, 
therefore, the 1935 scheme of the divisions of power between 
the centre and the units came to be generally adopted by the 
Constitution of India, except for such of its colonial 
provisions as were inconsistent with India's sovereignty.^ "^  
XV 
Obviously, except for the Muslim League which favoured 
fullest provincial autonomy the Indian objection to the Act 
of 1935 was not with regard to its strong centre but to the 
placement of overridding and ultimate powers in the hands of 
imperial chief executives and top bureaucrats having no 
accountability to the representative governmental 
institution in India. With the Muslim League, out of picture 
after partition, the Indian Constituent Assembly had hardly 
any serious opposition to face in creating a strong, 
centeralised and co-operative federation. 
In first chapter a survey has been made of the origin 
of the federal system in the world, Switzerland, U.S.A., 
U.S.S.R., Canada and Australia . It is also worthy of note 
that after the second world war, federation has become the 
main alternative to empire as a technique of aggregating 
large units under one government. In second chapter-I have 
discussed a comprehensive introduction which traces, the 
genesis and evolution of federalism in India from ancient 
time onwards. In third chapter-I have briefly discussed the 
Government of India Act of 1919 in which the British policy 
shifted in favour of the creation of a federation. Under 
this Act the provinces for first time got partial autonomy. 
In fourth chapter I have made a study of various 
proposals on federal India which had been submitted by 
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different political leaders. In fifth chapter i have make an 
exhaustive study of the federal structure under the Act of 
1935, as embodied in the constitution of free India. In last 
chapter, I have made a critical study of the different 
federal plans (especially Cabinet Mission plan). Almost all 
the political parties and groups were agreed on the 
proposals of Cabinet Mission. But as soon as Jawaharlal 
Nehru became President of the Indian National Congress he 
rejected the plan which led to the partition of the country. 
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Chapter - 1 
ORIGIN OF FEDERALISM 
A WORLD VIEW 
Switzerland 
Switzerland is the oldest living federation in the 
world. All other federations have come into existence much 
later. A survey of the swiss federal development as the 
mother system, is therefore, essential for any student of 
federalism. Many theories and principles have emanated from 
it. All other federations have borrowed, in one way or the 
other, from this country, with little or more changes here 
and there, in their federal structures. 
William E. Reppard says that it is a fact that 
Switzerland has been a democracy for nearly seven hundred 
years. The republicanism is more deeply rooted in 
Switzerland than anywhere else. "Monarchistic ways of 
thinking are alien to the swiss; he has no understanding for 
the power and privileges of a ruler for him, the state 
is an affair of all citizens, and its guidence is not be 
hereditary nor is it to be entrusted to an elected 
individual. "•'• 
Switzerland offers the best example of a constitutional 
system which has successfully integrated a population 
characterised by social, linguistic and religions divisions 
into a united country. According to Buck, the Swiss system 
has shown the possibility of close cooperation between 
peoples who were independent of each other and who are 
Still divided by language and relxgion. 
It is credible that six million people of Switzerland, 
who belong to three social stocks, speak three languages and 
follow two religions have woven themselves into a nation. 
Switzerland was the first country in Europe to adopt 
the federal system of the Government. The swiss 
constitution has recognised all the four languages spoken by 
the people of that country as official languages and has 
created a spirit of religions tolerance which is essential 
for the success of democracy. 
Swiss federation is the result of alliances as far 
back as 1291, and the process was accomplished in 1848.The 
process is marked by seven stages of development. Before 
1291 Switzerland was nothing but a number of separate 
states, known as cantons without a constitution. These 
cantons were under the suzerainty of the Hubsburg rulers of 
Austria. It was in 1291 that three forest cantons of Uri, 
Schwyz and unterwalden situated at the lake Luzern joined 
together in a confederation (Perpetual League) in order to 
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assert their independence from Austrian dominence. They 
successfully repulsed an attempt by the Habsburgs to regain 
freedom. Encouraged by this example, other cantons joined 
the League which, by 1353 included eight cantons. By 1648, 
when the Swiss Confederation was recognised by the treaty of 
Westphalia as a sovereign state, the number of member 
cantons rose to thirteen, all of which were German 
speaking.^ 
Adams mentions seven stages in the development of Swiss 
federation which are as follows:^ 
1) The league of three communities i.e. the men of the 
valley of Uri, the community of Schwyz and the mountaineers 
of the lower valley which subsequently become part of the 
canton of unterwalden in 1291. 
2) The confederation of eight cantons (1353). 
3) The confederation of thirteen cantons (1513). 
4) The Helvitic Republic (1798). 
5) The Act of Mediation with nineteen cantons (1803). 
6) The federal Pact, with twenty two cantons (1815). 
7) The Federal constitution of1848, which was revised in 
1874. 
The league formed in 1291 was solely German, as more 
German districts joined the first confederates. In the 
earliar times, much of what later become Switzerland, was 
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part of the Holy Roman Empire, and those deemed themselves 
fortunate as they depended directly upon the Emperor and not 
through intermediate Lords. The rise in 13th century of the 
Habsburgs, a noble family of Aargau ruled over much 
territory in the name of the Emperor Rudolf of Habsbergs 
occupied the imperial throne in 1273. Upon his death in July 
1291 a short period of anarchy followed. In 1351, the 
imperial city of Zurich, which had been engaged in war with 
Austria, joined the alliance of the four states who formed a 
wall of defence against Austria a market for their goods and 
above all a political centre. 
In 1352 Glarus and Zug were freed from Austrian rule, 
and were included in the alliance and in 1353 the city of 
Bern was added to the League, the confederation thus 
attaining its second phase of eight states. The Priests 
Charter was so called partly from its contents but sitll 
more from the facts which occasioned it. The Provost of the 
Grand-Moutier had suddenly attacked the Avoyer of Luzern and 
made him prisoner. It was the result of a personal quarrel. 
But this was an offence against the sovereignty of Luzern. 
It was proposed to adopt certain measures to prevent similar 
complications. Therefore, the confederates adopted "The 
Priest Charter". It provided for protecting the independence 
of the country. 
In 1393 the deputies of the eight confederates were 
assembled at Zurich and signed a treaty for strengthening 
the sovereignty. This was called the "Convenant" or 
convention of Sempach, signed on 22nd December 1481. By this 
convention the federal sovereignty was further enlarged by 
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the induction of two more cities of Freiburg and Solothurn 
in to the confederation. These new cities latter become the 
ninth and tenth states. In 1501 the cities of Basel and 
Schaffhausen became the eleventh and twelth states of the 
confederation and they were followed by Appenzell as 
thirteenth state in 1513. 
This was the third phase of confederation which now 
consisted of thirteen states or cantons. It lasted till 1798 
with out change, and was, marked by internal disputes, 
religious wars, and revolts of peasantry. 
Bern had now become the most powerful canton and 
extended its territory on all sides. The government and all 
official places were more and more concentrated in the hands 
of a few families of the higher burghers. 
From an early date the legislative authority of the 
confederation had been in the hands of Diets (Tagsatzungen) 
which lat^r called federal sessions. It was empowered to fix 
the date and place for the meetings to discuss general 
matters concerning each state, and place of meeting was 
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mentioned in the invitation. The deputies of the states used 
to meet together, communicated with each other the 
instructions from their respective states. Generally the 
meeting used to be held at fixed periods, and the 
invitations were generally sent from Zurich and was called 
the directing canton. It convoked and directed the Diets. It 
also served as intermediatry with foreign states, but it had 
no power and no initiative. 
The essential powers of the Diet were foreign affairs, 
war, and intercantonal disputes. 
Up to 1798 there had been simple alliance between 
different cantons, and there was no real federal 
constitution. The establishment of the Helvetic Republic in 
1798, was the first step at a constitution and fourth phase 
of the confederation. It was imposed upon Switzerland by 
foreign powers and was against the traditions of that 
country; the catons became simply administrative districts. 
Some were cut up and divided; others, again were 
united into one. the whole country was divided into two 
hostile factions, who were in continuous dispute, the 
minority consisted of centralist, who wanted to save the 
Republic. The majority was composed of federalists, who 
wanted a return to the federal form which existed up to 1798 
and which the cantons enjoyed internal sovereignty. 
At last Nepolian Bonapart invited the deputies of both 
the groups to Paris and held long consultations with them, 
as a result of which he devised a new federal scheme to 
Switzerland. This was termed as the "Act of Mediation." 
Federation was restored which now had nineteen cantons. Each 
was having a separate constitution of its choice. This was 
the fifth phase of the confederation. 
A Diet was created under the "Act of Mediation" in 
which each canton was represented by one deputy with limited 
powers (for he could only vote according to instruction from 
his canton). The nineteen deputies had between them twenty 
five votes. Every deputy from a canton with more than 
100,000 population had two votes, and there were six such 
cantons. The Diet met once a year in June at Zurich, Bern, 
Luzern, Freiburg, Solothurn, and Basel. Three of these 
cantons were catholic and three portestants. The head of the 
directing canton was Lundammann and also used to be the 
President of the Diet. 
The Act of Mediation was not acceptable to all 
parties. Meanwhile there was one more foreign intervention. 
The fall of Emperor Napoleon brought also with it the 
destruction of his work in Switzerland, the neutrality and 
independence of which were recognised by the Congress of 
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Vienna, on condition of the maintenance in the confederation 
of the new cantons; and in 1814 the Valias (a republic 
allied to the confederation from the middle ages till 1798). 
Neuchated (which from being subject to the Kind of Russia, 
had been bestowed by Napolean upon Marshal Berthier) and 
Geneva (which had been annexed to France under the directoiry 
in 1798, but was now independent and rendered more compact 
by the addition of some territory belonging to France and 
Savoy) were added the existing cantons. Finally, the 
perpatual neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of 
territory were guaranted by Austria, Great Britain, 
Portugal, Russia and Prussia in an Act signed at Paris on 
the 20th November 1815. 
The confederation now consisted of twenty two cantons, 
and a federal pact drawn up at Zurich by the diet in 1815, 
and accepted by the congress of Vienna. It was in some 
respects a return to the Pre-french Revolution and restored 
to the cantons a large portion of their formed sovereignty. 
But the federal tie was firmly maintained. There was a Diet 
for general affairs and deputies from each canton assembled 
at one of the three directing cantons viz. Zurich, Bern and 
Luzern. They could still only vote according to their 
instructions. Each canton had one vote. This was the sixth 
phase of the confederation. 
Then came an era of agitation and disputes. The 
confederation suffered from the weakness of the central 
authority. The cantons had become too free and their 
deputies instructions contradicted each other. 
The fall of the Bour bons in 1830 had its impact upon 
Swtizerland, patricians of Bern. The Aristocratic class in 
other cantons lost the supremacy which they enjoyed since 
the begining of the century and the people's power was 
greatly increased. In several months twelve cantons changed 
their constitution in a democratic sense, some peacefully 
and others by revolution. Most of the new constitutions 
conceded the principle of sovereignty of the people, and 
political equality of the citizens. In Basel the refusal to 
grant to the country folk proportional representation 
resulted in bloodshed, and the separation into two states, 
or half cantons - one urban and the other rural in 1833. 
To political disputes, religious troubles were added. 
In Aargau the constitution of 1831, where by the Grand 
Council was made to consist of two hundred members half 
being protestants and half catholics was revised in 1840, 
and by the new constitution the members were no longer to be 
chosen with any reference to creed, but upon the basis of 
wide popular representation. Thus giving a numerical 
advantage to the protestants. Discontent arose among the 
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catholics, and eventually some two thousand peasants of that 
faith took up arms, but were beaten by protestants of Aargau 
in January 1841, and the consequence was the suppression of 
the eight convents in that canton and confiscation of their 
most valuable property. This measure was generally 
considered to be a violation of the federal pack of 1815, 
the 12th Articles of which guaranted the existence of 
convents. 
The first result of the suppression of the convents 
was the fall of the Liberal Government of Luzern. Two years 
later, the new Government convoked delegates of the catholic 
cantons at Rothen, and there is secret conferences, and 
under the pretext that religion was in danger cleanly. It 
was violation against the spirit of the federal pact. 
In 1844 the Grand Council of Luzern voted in favour of 
the Jesuits appeal to be entrusted with the direction of 
superior public education, and this led to hostilities 
between Liberal and Ultramuntane parties. Bonds of 
volunteers attacked Luzern and were defeated, the expulsion 
of the Jesuits become a burning question, and finally when 
the ordinary Diet assembled at Bern in July 1847, the 
Sonderbund cantons declared their intention of preserving in 
their separate alliance untill the others cantons had 
declared the re-establishment of the Aargau convents. 
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On the 4th November 1847, after the deputies of the 
Sonderbund had left the Diet this League was delcared to be 
dissolved, and hostilities broke out between the two 
contending parties. A short and decisive compaign of twenty 
five days ensued, Freiburg was taken by the federal troops 
under General Dufour. Later Luzern opened its gates, the 
small cantons and valais capitulated and she strife came to 
an end. 
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As soon as the Sonderbund was dissolved, it become 
necessary to proceed to the revision of the federal pact. 
Opinions necessarily varied as to the manner in which this 
should be affected, and four different groups were formed. 
This consisted of:-
(1) Partisan of the maintenance of the status quo who were 
to be found only in the canton of Neuchatel. 
(2) Partisans of a a mdoerate refrom of the pact of 1815, 
the bases being preserved, and no representation 
entrusted to the people. Amongst the leaders of this group, 
Furrer Naff and Munzinger should be particularly mentioned. 
(3) Partisans of a return to the Act of Mediation. The 
leader of this group was Casimir Pfyffer of Luzern. 
(4) Partisans of complete change with the constitution of 
the United States as a model. This opinion was 
prevalant in french. Switzerland, under the Leadership of 
Druey of vaud and Fazy of Geneva. 
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On the 17th February 1848 the task of drawing up a 
constitution was confided to a Committee of fourteen 
members. The project was submitted to the cantons, and 
accepeted at once by thirteen and a half, others joined 
during the summer and. the new constitution was finally 
promulgated with the assent of all one the 12th November. 
This was the seventh and last phase of the 
confederation, by the adoption of a Federal Cosntitution for 
the whole of Swtizerland, being the first which was entirely 
the work of Swiss, without any foreign influence. The new 
constitution, as M. Droz well remarks, gave to the 
confederation the force which it required, on the one side 
to maintain order at home and on the other to represent and 
defend its common interests with respect to other nations. 
Two Ligislatives Chambers were for the first time created 
the National Council, to which deputies were elected 
proportionally to the population, thus favouring the larger 
cantons and representing the Swiss people as a whole; and 
the Council of the states, which resembled the American 
Senate, each canton large or small, contribting two members. 
The two chambers constituted the federal Assembly, and an 
executive power was created, called the Federal Council. It 
consisted of seven members, like the committee appointed at 
the time of the Sonderbund, and five out of seven become 
members of it. 
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By the constitution of 1848 the right was reserved to 
the confederation of disposing of the troops for the 
maintenance of internal order and national independence. A 
great benefit was conferred upon the nation by the 
unification of such matter as coinage, weights and measures 
and posts, all of which came under the control of the 
confederation. The cantons surrendered to it the exclusive 
right to levy duties at the frontiers of the country, and 
the monopoly of Jubricating war-powder and they abolished 
numerous internal dues and tolls receiving certain 
indemnities in return. 
It was clear that there must now be one federal 
capital and Bern was chosen. It become the seat of the two 
chambers, and of the federal council. 
The constitution of 1848 was constructed with a view 
of satisfying both elements, cantonal and National. It was 
essentially a work of compromise, and the central power 
created by it naturally resulted in a diminution of the 
sovereignty of the cantons, rendering them less independent 
individually. Whilst they evidently gained in compactness so 
far as their external relation were concerned. 
It was natural that, as in process of time commerce 
and industry were developed, and as the differences between 
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the ligislation of the various cantons become more apparant, 
a revision of the first realy Swiss constitution should be 
found necessary. This was proposed both in 1871 and 1872, 
but the partisans of a further centralization, though 
successful in the chambers, were defeated upon an appeal to 
the popular vote on the 12th May 1872 by a majority of 
between five and six thousands. 
The question was by no means settled, and in 1874 a 
new project of revision, more acceptable to the partisans of 
cantonal independence, was adopted by the people. The 
cantons were about two to one in favour of the revision. 14 
1/2 declaring for and 7 1/2 against it. 
In concluding this historical sketch no way remark 
that the Swiss constitution, as at present existing, 
fulfills the two condition which Prof. Dicey, in his 
lectures introductory to the study of the law of the 
constitution lays down as essential to the for:3ation of a 
federal state. 
There must exist, in the first place, a body of 
countries such as the cantons of Switzerland, the colonies 
of America or the Province of Canada, so closely connected 
by locality, by history, by race or the like, as to be 
capable of bearing, in the eyes of their inhabitants, an 
impress of common nationality. It will also be generally 
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found that lands which now form part of a federal state were 
at some stage of their existence bound together by close 
alliance or by subsection to a common sovereign. It is 
facts that this earlier connection is essential to the 
formation of a federal state. But it is certain that where 
federalism flourishes, it is in general the slowly-matured 
fruit of this earlier connection. 
A second condition which Prof. Dicey declares to be 
absolutely essential to the founding of a federal system, is 
the existence of very peculiar state of sentiment among the 
inhabitants of the countries which it is proposed to unite. 
They must desire, and must not desire unity. 
The phase of sentiment in short, which forms a 
necessary condition for the formation of a federal state is 
that the people should wish to form for many purposes a 
single nation. 
Here again Switzerland fulfils the second condition 
explained by Prof. Dicey. The Swiss cantons Whilst desiring 
union, do not desire that unity which would lead to the 
habitual exercise of supreme legislative authority by one 
central power such as is found in the British Parliament. 
The Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, only lasted from 
1798 to 1803. It is certain that at the time of Sonderbund 
civil War in 1874 the citizen of Roman Catholic Luzern felt 
far Keener loyalty to their canton then to the 
confederation. 
There must be a desire for national union, and at the 
same time there must be a determination to maintain the 
independence of each man's separate state. 
U.S.A. 
The constitution of the United States is also 
federal. It exemplifies the three essential elements of 
federalism, i.e. the supremacy of the constitution; the 
division of powers, and the independence of the federal 
judiciary. It reached this complete form through two stages 
from a condition in which the original thirteen states were 
colonies, owed a common allegiance to Britain. The first 
stage begins with the adoption of the Articles of 
confederation in 1781. It was a loose union, a "rope of 
sand", as Woodrow Wilson called these Articles, "which could 
bind no one". The second stage starts in 1787 when a 
convention at Philadelphia framed the present constitution, 
which was accepted by all the thirteen member states and 
became operative in 1789. Now, U.S. became a true federation 
because it established a central executive with very 
definite powers. Having regard to the need of a strong 
federal government, as proved by the difficulties with which 
the confederation was faced for almost a decade, it 
established a strong centre without weakening the states. 
As to the division of powers, the constitution of the 
United States made a double division, first it divides the 
three organs of government — i.e.,. legilative, executive, 
and judiciary and made them quite distinct from one another. 
Secondly, it divides the powers between the federal and 
state governments in such a way as to secure to the 
federating units all the powers which are not absolutely 
necessary to the federal centre. Thus the powers of the 
central government are strictly defined. The remaining 
powers are left to the states. In other words, the 
constitution enumerates in a precise list what powers the 
federal government has to exercise, adding a list of powers 
forbidden to the federal government, and also a list of 
powers forbidden to the states. And so that there should be 
no loophole for abuse, the 10th Amendment (carried in 1791, 
so near to the original promulgation as to be, in effect, 
a part of it) states that the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to 
the people. The net result is that the Federal Government of 
the United States can exercise no power which is not 
conferred upon it by the constitution. The states on the 
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other hand can exercise any power belonging to an 
independent sovereign state except those of which they have 
been directly or indirectly deprived by the constitution. 
The powers may be distributed in one of two ways. 
Either the constitution states what powers the federal 
authority shall have and leaves the remainder to the 
federating units, or it states what powers the federating 
units shall possess and leaves the remainder to the federal 
authority. This remainder is generally called the "reserve 
of powers" is with the federal authority, the constitution 
approaches more to that of a unitary states. The division of 
powers, by whichever of the two ways it is carried into 
effect, implies that both the legislative of the dederation 
and that of each of the federating units are limited in 
their scope and that neither of them is supreme. The federal 
constitution is, in fact, a charter of rights and duties of 
the federal and state authorities. Tithese rights and duties 
must be kept in their proper proportions the rights asserted 
by any one authority, and the duties required of one 
authority by another, must not be beyond the schedule laid 
down in the constitution. 
As regards the legislature, the constitution 
establishes a congress of two Houses - the senate and the 
House of Representatives - in the uper of which it secures 
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the equality of all states and makes this an immutable law.^ 
As the states which came together to form the United 
States were vastly unequal in population, the smaller ones 
had a genuine fear of being dominated by the larger and more 
powerful units of the new federal union. The need for 
balancing the differences between large and small states led 
to what has been described as the "great compromise" whereby 
it was decided that while the lower house of congress should 
represent the states according to their population, the 
Senate should give equal representation to all these units, 
big as well as small. Hence the arrangement that each state 
should send two representatives to the Senate. The House of 
representatives, with proportional representation for the 
states, stands for the national principle in the American 
federal system while the Senate represents the federal 
principle by giving formal recognition to the legal equality 
of the component units irrespective of their size, power or 
importance. . So far as the Executive is concerned, it 
establishes a four-year Presidency and details the method of 
election to this office. It enumerates the President's 
powers and checks his diplomatic powers by requiring the 
ratification of the Senate; so that the external 
sovereignty which the states have surrendered is still 
ultimately controlled by the Senate in which they are 
equally represented. 
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Every federation has a division of the judicial 
function between the central and the state authorities. The 
contrast between the federations in this respect is full of 
interest, and affords a mass of instruction about the 
diverse ways in which political independence can in practice 
be modified for a good wider then that of the independent 
units, and how sovereignty may be variously distributed. 
The U.S.A. has the longest continuous history of 
judicial institutions in a federation. Her first federal 
courts were provided for by the congress of the 
confederation, but they were weak and of a temporary nature. 
The constitution of 1789 greatly extended the federal 
judicial power, for as Hamilton said. "It is in the nature 
of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent. One question is very 
significant in the philosophy of federaion whether the 
federation should have its own inferior courts, or establish 
only a Supreme Court for appeals."^ 
Article III of the constitution defines the judicial 
power of the United States, and the organization of the 
courts has been settled by the successive judiciary Acts 
passed by congress beginning in 1789. There is a Supreme 
Court, several circuit courts of Appeals, and about eighty 
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District courts. 
The judicial functions of the federal courts follow 
from the constitution. In 1798, restricted the judicial 
power of the United States by the withdrawal of suits 
against one of the states by citizens of another state, or 
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. But the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the article so as to reduce 
the immunity of officers of a state from the consequences of 
unconstitutional behaviour. 
Next, because domestic tranquility requires, that the 
contentions of states should be peaceably terminated by a 
common judicatory; and because, in a free country, justice 
ought not to depend on the will of either of the litigants' 
the Supreme Court was vested with the settlement of 
controversies between two or more states. In this repsect 
the Supreme Court has played a magnificant part, for its 
authority has been evoked in thirty-nine cases, and in 
judgements have been respected and peacefully carried out. 
The Supreme Court with such functions, is the most 
original, the most distinctively American contribution to 
Political Science to be found in the constitution. It is the 
cement which has fixed firm the whole Federal Structure. Now 
every federation must have such a court, although it may be 
organised in many different ways. 
•It 
Centralization 
The term "Centralization" refers to the relationship 
between different levels of government. The process of 
centralization involves assumption by the higher level of 
government of both activities and authority from the lower 
level. 
Centralization is the tendency for the national 
government to assume influence or control over functions and 
fields formerly considered under state jurisdiction.9. 
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The American Supreme Court is in a key position to 
mold the constitutions fabric to meet the needs of an 
industrial nation. One of the most useful tools of 
constitutional interpretation in favour of national power 
must be discussed. 
The theory of implied power was enunciated by the 
Supreme Court. The implied powers concept is now-a-days 
applied in directions and in situation of which Marshall 
never dreamed. 
The theory of implied powers has greatly enhanced the 
federal authority by allowing the central government to 
exercise those power which are not specifically given to it; 
but which are essential to the powers which are specifically 
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central powers, e.g. the constitution gives the central the 
power to control inter-state trade and commerce, but to 
exercise this power it might have the police powered also 
the power to prohibit the manufacture, transport of certain 
goods injurious to the health of the people. 
The American constitution is generally described as a 
classical example of a rigid constitution. A certain amount 
of rigidity is inevitable in the constitution of a federal 
union. It was necessary, therefore, to make the constitution 
a sacred compact embodying a distribution of powers. The 
thirteen contracting states were naturally anxious to make 
it difficult for later generations to interfere with the 
constitution without strong reasons and overwhelming 
support. The framers of the constitution were also wedded to 
the doctrine of separation of powers and after demarcating 
the spheres of the three branches of the federal government 
in the constitution, they took care to provide that the 
lines of this separation should not be crossed through easy 
amendment of the constitution. 
Of course, the founding fathers forsaw the need for 
amendment, for no constitution bound forever by tight ropes 
if it is to endure. Accordingly, they laid down a procedure 
for amendment which in their opinion, was fairly simple and 
not too difficult. In fact, Hamilton, one of the 
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constitution makers, argued in an article in The Federalist 
that the amending process could not have been made any 
easier without inviting constitutional instability. But the 
process which the framers considered to be fairly simple and 
easy has, in practice turned out to be the most difficult in 
the world on account of the appearance of two factors which 
they could not foresee, ziz., the increase in the size of 
congress and in the number of states forming the union. 
The method of amendment is set forth in Article V of 
the constitution in the following terms: "The congress, 
whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary 
shall propose amendments to this constitution, or on the 
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several 
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, 
which in either case shall be valid to all intents and 
purposes as part of this constitution when ratified by the 
legislatures three-fourths of the several states, or by 
conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the 
other mode of ratification may be proposed by congress."^•^. 
It will seen that according to the procedure laid down in 
this Article, an amendment to the American Constitution has 
to go through two stages. The first stage is that of 
proposal. An amendment may be proposed either by a two-
thirds vote of both houses of congress or by a 
constitutional convention to be called by congress on the 
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application of at least two-thirds (34) of the states. After 
a proposal for amendment has been duly made, it is submitted 
to the states for ratification and comes into force when it 
is ratified either by the legislature of thee-fourths (38) 
of the states or by conventions in three-fourths of them. 
Congress can, when submitting a proposal for amendments to 
the states, indicate which of the two methods the latter are 
to employ for ratification. If, however, congress does not 
indicate its preference, the state can choose either of the 
two methods laid down in the consititution. 
Although the constitution lays down two alternative 
for intiating a proposal for amendment, in practice only one 
of them viz., joint resolution of the two houses of 
congress, has been successfully employed. All amendments so 
far adopted have been proposed through this procedure. In 
spite of frequent attempts, the alternative method of having 
amendments launched by a national convention has remained 
unused. As regard ratification, action by legislatures has 
been preferred to that by convention in states. In fact, all 
the twenty-six amendments with one exception (the twenty-
first) have been ratified by the action of state 
legislatures. 
The constitution lays down no time-limit within which 
the states must take action on a proposed amendment. This 
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occasionally leads to anomalies. For instance, in 
submitting, the eighteenth, twentieth and twenty-first 
amendments, congress prescribed a time-limit of seven years. 
This action encouraged the view that amendments "died of old 
age" if no time-limit was fixed. In 1921, the Supreme Court 
seemed to support the view that ratification should be 
completed a 'within some reasonable time after proposal." 
But in 1939, the same court held a different view when it 
declared that the Child Labour Amendment was still "alive" 
after 15 years and that the question whether should be a 
time limit being a political rather than a legal one, it was 
for congress and not for the courts to decide what was a 
'reasonable' period for the completion of the process of 
ratification. In practice therefore, the view that has 
prevailed is that an amendment remains alive indefinitely 
unless congress prescribes a time-limit. 
The amendment procedure laid down in the Unites State 
constitution is as indicated in the following chart: 
Proposal Ratification 
1. By two-thirds votes of the 1. By the legislatures 
the two houses of congress of three-fourths (38) 
(used in all cases of amend- of the states 
ments proposed) (used for all 
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successful amendments 
except twenty-first. 
2. By constitutional convention 2. By conventions in 
called by congress on the three-fourths (38) 
petetion of two-thirds (34) of the States 
of the states (Never so far used) (used to ratify 
the 21st amendment 
Finally, the constitution has created a serious 
animoly by laying down that two of its provision are 
virtually unamendable. Thus no state can be deprived of its 
equal representation in the Senate without its own consent. 
Similarly, no state can be divided, nor can any two states 
be combined without the approval of the state legislatures 
concerned. The anomaly lies in the fact that Munro 
points out, an unamendable constitution is a contradiction 
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m term.-^ ^ It amounts to one generation of people imposing, 
for all time, a limitation on the sovereignty of future 
generation and, thus, installing 'a government by the 
graveyards. • ^-^  The fact of the matter is that even in 
respect of two points in question the constitution need not 
be considered as absolutely unamendable. If an amendment on 
either or both these points becomes imperative, it can be 
achieved by removing the exceptions by a preliminary 
amendment and then bringing about the desired change by a 
second amendment. If besides, it is desired to do away with 
the undue influence of small states in Congress, the purpose 
can be achieved by so amending the constitution as to 
provide that in case of a disagreement between the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, the disagreement should be 
resolved by means of a Joint session of the two houses 
instead of by conference and separates concurrence as at 
present. 
The above discussion points to the Qbvious conclusion 
that formal amendment of United State consititution is 
extraordinarily difficult. It is no easy matter to obtain a 
two thirds majority of both houses of Congress in order to 
initiate a proposal for amendment and then to have it 
ratified by at least three fourth of states. The difficulty 
appears even more pronounced when it is remembered that in 
most cases, no time-limit is set for the completion of the 
process of ratification of an amendment proposed by the 
requisite number of states. 
Hamilton, one of the framers of American Constitution, 
believe that the amending process, guarded "equally against 
that ex-^me facility which would render the constitution too 
mutable and the extreme facility which would render the 
constitution too mutable and the extreme difficulty which 
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might perpetuate discovered faults." 
The above survey of the American Federalism shows that 
its constitution maker have borrowed much from Switzerland 
except direct democracy which is there in some cantons. 
Secondly inspite of the theory of implied powers American 
Federal Centre had not become so strong to creat a fear-
psychosis in the member states. Thirdly the process of 
constitutionally amendment is so difficult as well as under 
the control of the states the states are not apprehensive of 
either the federal domination or domination of a combination 
of a few bigger states. America is the best example of a 
powerful and yet a decent realised federation. 
U.S.S.R. 
The Soviet Union is a federal state. Brezhnev 
constitution delcares it to be an "integral, federal, 
multinational state formed on the principle of socialist 
federalsim as a result of free self-determination of nations 
and the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist 
Republics. "-^ ^ The Soviet leaders take pride in such a 
"voluntary" Union of the units constituting the Soviet 
Federation. 
A proper understanding of Soviet federalism 
necessitates study of its basic theory. Prior to October 
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Revolution, the Czarist goverment was exploiting these 
colonies around mainland of Russia. They wanted 
Russification of these colonial peoples. Hence the 
inhabitants of these colonies were always ready to revolt 
against the Czars who in their turn supressed these 
uprisings with an iron hand. When the Bolsheviks over ran 
the Czarist regime and captured power they assured of 
equality and sovereignty to the Russians and colonial 
people. They also promosed them freedom to determine the 
form of their governments. From 1917 to 1923, Stalin who 
held the portfolio of "Affairs of Nationalities' destroyed 
the capitalist system, but also and established governments 
in there are as on socialist lines. The early constitution, 
framed in 1918, established the "Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic" and conferred "autonomy" upon these 
Republics.^^. 
The federal principles was embodied in the Stalin 
constitution as well. The new political structure of the 
Soviet Union was to consist of Union Republics, Autonomous 
Republics, Autonomous Regions and National Areas organised 
on the basis of nationality and minor national groups. 
However, it may be said that Lenin and Stalin who 
claimed themselves to be the followers of Marxist ideology 
were in fact opposed to the idea of federalism. Lenin 
31 
himself had delcared, in 1913, "We are against federation on 
principle. It weakens economic ties, it is unfit for a 
single state." For the development of a true socialist 
state, they introduced centralization to weaken the federal 
principle of autonomy to the units. . It was out of sheer 
necessity that Lenin had reconciled to the principle of 
national self-determination. During revolutionary upheaval, 
the colonies wanted to become independent. Hence to keep 
them within Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks not only deceived 
then to grant right of self-determination but allowed them 
theoritically at least, to secede from the Union if they so 
desired. Lenin himself was vehemently opposed to the idea of 
secession. He often said, "We do not want separation at all. 
We want as large a state as possible."^^ Hence it is clear 
that concept of federalism and right of secession of the 
Units were the out come of mrre expediency. Neumann has very 
well portrayed the above view in the following words: "The 
communist ideal is still one of the absolute unity but the 
Soviet leaders have learned this goal can be reached only by 
indirect means the federal form of government, together 
with an emphasis on the preservation of national culture and 
the eocnomic development of Non-Russian regions is more 
likely to win over these masses and thus pave the way to a 
fuller unity. The aim of federalism in the Soviet Union is 
therefore the establishment of a truly unitary system. •'•' 
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However, it must be noted that federalism was not 
accepted in the U.S.S.R. as a rigid dogma Federalism was 
recognised as a transitional form of state organization. 
Lenin made it clear that federation was only "a transitional 
form on the road to'complete unity."^° 
Thus the Soviet federation was a union of 
nationalities and national groups organized into political 
entities of four different types, viz.. Union republics, 
autonomous republics, autonomous regions and national areas. 
The Union Republics, which possess the highest status among 
the federating units of the U.S.S.R. Autonomous republics, 
autonomous regions and national areas exist within the Union 
Republics and enjoy a certain measure of autonomy because 
they were inhabited predominantly by a distinct national 
group. 
The Soviet Union is, in fact, a centralized state. 
Apart from the right of secession, says, Schapiro, the 
Soviet constitution "depicts a structure which is much more 
closely knit and much more centrifugal then is usually the 
case in federations."-^^ The distribution of powers made by 
the constitution makes the federal (All-Union) government 
more powerful then its counterpart in any other federation. 
Thus, foreign relations, defence, admission of new republic 
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into the union, foreign trade on the basis of state 
monopoly, monetary detemination of taxes and revenues which 
were to go to the Union Republican and local budgets, 
administration of banks, industrial institutions, social 
insurance, labour legislation, administration of transport 
and communications, judicial organization and procedure — 
all these matters fall within the jurisdiction of the 
central government. In the light of these vast and broadly 
ill-defined powers, it is not incorrect to describe the All 
Union government of the U.S.S.R. as a colossus which 
bestrides the Russian world and made the country a highly 
centralized state. " 
There were several provisions in the constitution 
which empowered the All Union government to invade even that 
sphere which is formally reserved to the Republics. There is 
a general provision that the decision of any soviet may be 
over-ruled by a higher soviet in the event of a conflict 
between the federal law and the Republican law, the former 
prevailed. Article 134 authorised the council of ministers 
of the U.S.S.R. to suspend the decisions of the ministers of 
Union Republics and Article 121(7) empowered the Presidium 
of the Supreme soviet of the U.S.S.R. to annual these 
decisions. 
The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had the power to 
alter the distribution of powers laid down in the 
constitution. Acting by itself it could curtail the 
jurisdiction of Union Republics. 
The right to interpret laws belonged to the presidium 
of the Soviet Union — a central authority. According to the 
Soviet constitution, "the U.S.S.R. protects the rights of 
the Union Republics but the protection is given by the 
Presidium and not by an independent judiciary. Now it is 
clear that "the extent of competence enjoyed by the 
Republics at any time can ultimately depend on the will of 
the Union to allow them independence of action in this 
sphere. "^ -^  
The U.S.S.R. was a one party state. The communist 
party was in effective control of the administration of the 
country at all levels. members of the party dominate the 
legislative and executive branches of government not only in 
the Union but also in the Union Republics and the other 
administrative services of the country. The party itself was 
a monolithic organization with a highly centralized power 
structure. This kind of control of the party, made the 
Soviet system of government a highly integrated one. 
In view of the highly centralised character of the 
Soviet federation, it seems natural to conclude the 
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provisions of Article 14 merely guaranteed the right of the 
republics to exercise cultural autonomy and to use the 
language of the region. The Soviet federal system may, 
therefore, be said to combine political and economic 
centralization with cultural decentralization. In actual 
practice the measure of autonomy enjoyed by the republics 
depended on the over-all policy of the communist party. 
While it is true that all vital control is in hands of 
central leaderhsip. it is true also that local 
administrative united of all grades had some opportunities 
of actively participating in the execution of centrally 
worked out policies.^^ 
Article 173 of the constitution described the 
procedure to be followed for amending the constitution of 
the land. According to this article an amendment to the 
constitution had to be passed separately, by a two-thirds 
majority in each of the two houses of the Supreme soviet of 
the U.S.S.R. The requirement of a two-thirds majority seemed 
to give some rigidity to the Soviet constitution. But this 
was not practically the case, because the Supreme Soviet of 
the U.S.S.R. was completely dominated by one single party. 
It is, therefore, a fact that the political leaders of the 
Soviet state had no difficulty in getting the required two-
thirds majority for any constitutional amendment proposed by 
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them. 
The judicial system of U.S.S.R. differed radically 
from those prevailing in the states of the West. Firstly, 
there was no separation of powers in the Soviet Union and 
the Soviet judiciary was a part of the administration. The 
entire judicial system worked in close co-operation with the 
Procurator-General and his department. The well-known 
doctrine of independent of judiciary was very differently 
understood in the U.S.S.R. Soviet leaders openly recognise 
the fact that the Soviet judiciary does not stand outside 
Politics and that it was controlled by the party. Secondly, 
the Soviet judiciary was characterised by an extensive use 
of the elective principle. All judges in the Soviet Union as 
also the assessors, were elected by the appropriate Soviets 
or directly by the poepole. Thirdly, the role of the 
judiciary in the Soviet Union was different from what it is 
supposed to be in other countries. Its function was not only 
to dispense justice but also to protect the socialist order 
against the attacks by counter-revolutionaries.^-^ 
The Australia 
Australia has a federal form of government. The 
federation was established in 1901 by an Act of British 
parliament by which the six former colonies conferred upon 
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the federal government certain power previously held by 
them, for example defence, foreign affairs, customs, 
immigration, posts and telegraphs etc. - function of 
national importance as distinct from regional and local 
importance. All other powers were either held by the 
colonies (states) or shared with the federal government. 
Indeed the Australian constitution intended to enshrine a 
highly decentralised system, with a minimum powers and 
functions for the federal government. However, the 
overriding tendency has been towards centralisation giving 
rise to tension and conflict between the federal and state 
governments. 
Surprisingly this shift in the balance of power has 
taken place without constitutional alterations. On most 
occasions when attempts have been made to change the 
constitution through referrendum for the prupose of giving 
more powers to the federal government, the idea has been 
rejected by the people, and yet the power of the federal 
government has increased steadily. 
Therefore, Australia must be counted as one of the 
world's most successful federation. It has changed its 
character in many ways since its foundation in 1901, but the 
changes have been accomplished by negotiation and a 
willingness to compromise. Australia has had one great 
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advantage over other federation which have made a success, 
in p a r t i c u l a r Canada and Swi tze r l and ; a homogeneous 
population almost wholly of U.K. descent, might have served 
t o keep the co lon ies t o g e t h e r . A u s t r a l i a ' s s i x c l o n i e s 
developed s e p a r a t e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y , but t h e i r common 
c u l t u r a l he r i t age , kept them close in sp i t e of the vast 
d is tances which separated them.^'* 
There i s some problems in identifying the cons t i tu t ion 
of Aus t ra l i a , in which the fundamental work of government 
cons i s t of more than the formal or wri t ten document. I t 
i n c l u d e s such t h i n g s as J u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s , s t a t u t e s , 
unwrit ten customs and convention, however "in the Austral ian 
cons t i t u t ion are present a l l the cha rac t e r i s t i c features of 
f e d e r a l i s m , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers among bodies of 
l imited and co-ordinate au thor i ty , the supermacy of the 
cons t i t u t i on , and the author i ty of the courts to in t e rp re t 
the cons t i tu t ion . "^^ 
The f i r s t concrete proposal was put forward by the 
B r i t i s h Government in 1850 but encountered strong opposition 
in the country. Because the co lonis t s were in tent in the 
f i r s t p l ace on bu i ld ing r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and r e s p o n s i b l e 
government in s eve ra l c o l o n i e s , and were su sp i c ious of 
London. 
The s i x co lon ies were a s s e r t i n g t h e i r s e p a r a t e 
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independence from Britain and form their own government. But 
due to their common origin, Geography and culture, foreign 
and defencive affairs. Economic advantage and practical 
convenience created a need for some form of concerted action 
between the colonies and even a formal union. 
In 1885 a convention of the six Australian Governments 
with Newzealand and Fiji was held in Sydney. The main 
purpose of the convention was to discuss common action in 
the face of french and German colonisation. Its main 
achievement was to carry unanimously, a resolution favouring 
the formation of a "Federal Australian Council" to consist 
of two representatives from each self-governing colony and 
one from each crown colony. The council was to have power to 
deal with naval defence relation with the Pacific islands. 
The customs tariff was notably not mentioned, and the 
council was given no independent financial resources nor 
executive arm. The British Parliament provided the legal 
framework for this by enacting the Federal Council of 
Australia Act 1885. The Council served two useful purposes. 
It provided many colonial leaders with regular appointment 
for mutual discussion and development of an inter-colonial 
outlook, and it demonstrated the need for a much stronger 
type of Federal Union.^^ 
'iO 
"On 24 October 1889, Parkes, by now the Grand Old Man 
of Australian as well as new South Wales politics, made a 
widely publicised and praised speech at Tenterfield, New 
South Wales, calling for a conference of Australasian 
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Governments to consider the need for a true federation." 
In this meeting parkes, become a premier of New South Wales. 
He emphasised for stronger union before the representatives 
of the six Australian and New Zealand Governments. 
The first National Australian Convention came to meet 
in Sydney on 2 March 1891 with seven representatives from 
each Australian colony and three from New Zealand. It was 
apparant that the New Zealand had no intention of joining 
with Australia, though they kept a sympathetic eye on the 
federating process. In 1892 parks become as President of the 
Australian federal League, and fought for the adoption of 
the 1891 draft constitution, he become leader of the 1897-
1898 Federal Convention, and the Chief Australian Spokesman 
in negotiation with the British Government. 
The first federal parliamentary discussions connected 
with the nature of the federal arrangements which were 
likely to be accepted. They were generally speaking, about a 
substantial area of autonomous power for the colonies; this 
was put as a preference for the 'state right' federalism of 
the U.S.A. rather than the centralist federalism of Canada. 
President of the convention, moved a general resolution and 
called for a new federal authority with a bicameral 
parliament, the upper House consisting of equal member of 
representatives from each state and the lower House elected 
on a population basis, with a responsible Government, 
executive drawn from the party with a Lower House majority 
advising a Governer - General as titular head, and a federal 
'Supreme Court* to hear all Australian appeals; the federal 
authorities should be given closely defined specific powers, 
undefined residue to the states; customs duties an exclusive 
federal matter and interstate trade to be absolutely free; 
federation to control the armed forces. This resolution of 
1891 had fairly outlined the general structure of the 
federation in Australia.^^ "The constitution of Australia is 
contained in a statute of the British parliament" and alone 
among those of modern federation, was adopted not as a 
result of war, threat of war, or an acute sense of the ills 
that would follow continued disunion, but developed from a 
delibrate calculation of the advantages of the advantage of 
union by a people that had never been subjected to any 
serious disturbance of its peace. The constitution was 
formulated at series of conventions extending over nearly a 
decade; its framers had ample time to study the operation of 
other constitutions and to make a careful selection of those 
features that seemed most suited to their own needs" 
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"The extreme decentralization of administration and 
the wide separation of the colonies put great obstacles in 
the way of federation, although the idea was almost as old 
as Australia. The main internal motive for federation was 
the advantage of a common tariff and free trade between the 
colonies. •••^^ 
The difficulties of Australian federalism continue 
because of continuing struggle between two sets of opinions. 
On the one hand there are those who would like to see more 
central control, even to the extent of abolishing the 
states. On the other hand, there are elements at work urging 
that federalism be maintained so that the state's remain a 
strong force in the system of government. 
The centralists who propose abolishing the states 
argue that the states are redundant creating artificial 
barriers and divisions; it is incorrect to believe that 
states brings decision making closer to the people and that 
they reflect the geography of the country. Decision making 
would be more elaborate and easier if there existed only one 
central authority and a set of local governments. Their 
boarders seem irrelevant states exist only for negative or 
selfish reasons. They are at best redundant and at worst 
inefficient. These arguments for centralisation seem to be 
negative. But there are several positive arguments in favour 
of centralisation. It is argued that Australia is a one 
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country and australians are one people, whose needs and 
aspirations can best be met by national policies and 
planning."^ ^ To many economist the management of the economy 
and an over all national priorities demands the abolition of 
the states. It should be pointed out that obviously there 
are certain vested trade interest groups and other pressure 
groups who would rather deal with one government than seven. 
The argument in support of retaining the states run on 
these lines. Although the state bondaries may appear 
artificial, the fact remains that the people have genuine 
loyalties to their states and they consider themselves 
different from others. J. Holmes call this federal culture^ ^^  
meaning that the states are distinct from one another and 
their electorate feel this way. The people process and sense 
of belonging to their state as distinct from their loyalty 
to the nation. The states differ in their historical 
development, social characteristics, and legal and 
educational systems. They have different political 
institutions and tradition. The state are themselves as 
having separate identities and so long this remains there 
will continue to be a strong force for retaining them. There 
is good evidence to support this view point. The electorates 
has consistently opposed referendum proposals, and 
invariably because of the fear that yes vote would mean 
u 
erosion of their power. People believe that power should be 
retained in the states because in some way centralism would 
lead to socialism and eventual totalitarianism. ^ Although 
this line of argument may seem far-fetched, nevertheless it 
has been used, possibly with its desired effects. 
Federalism has powerful supporters in the country and 
they would fight for the retention of the states no matter 
what their selfish and political motives are politics being 
basically about power, any intrusion into state sphere by 
the central government is resisted by such interested 
individuals and groups. The liberal and country parties 
remain basically committed to retaining the federal 
framework. The Senate has often acted as protector of the 
states by defeating such legislation which would have 
curtailed state rights; the High Court has also at times 
safeguarded state interests in its interpretation of the 
constitution which itself acts as a force of federalism 
In the Australian constitution are present all the 
characteristic features of federalism — the distribution of 
powers among bodies of limited and co-ordinate authority, 
the supremacy of the constitution, and the authority of the 
courts to interpret the constitution. 
The constitution states the powers of the commonwealth 
Government and leaves the rest to the states. The list of 
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powers enumerated is wide one, but it still leaves a large 
area of freedom to the states. The constitution establishes 
a federal Executive - nominally the Governor - General in 
Council, but actually responsible to the federal legislature 
which consist of two Houses, namely, the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. In the Senate the states are 
equally represented (ten from each), in the House on a 
population basis. The constitution originally allowed the 
states to make what arrangements they liked for election to 
Parliament, but these provisions were among a number which 
the federal legislature might change without consititutional 
amendment; and the existing arrangement by federal law is 
that the House of Representatives shall be elected through 
out the commonwealth in one-number constituencies, while the 
Senators shall be elected in each state the whole state 
being the electoral division, but both under a system of 
preferential voting. 
The constitution establishes a federal judiciary with 
a supreme court which has power to interpret the 
constitution as in the United States, and to deal with all 
cases of conflict between the states or between any of the 
states and the federal Aurhtority. The Supreme court in 
Australia differs from that in the United States in that, 
while the united states Supreme court can not entertain 
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appeals from states on pure state law, the Australian 
Supreme Court can and does. -^  
It is said that "the court assumes a powers to over-
rule or control the action of the people's representatives. 
The constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained, and 
established by the people. All legislation must conform to 
the principles it lays down. When an act of congress- is 
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to 
the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the 
Government has only one duty - to lag the article of the 
constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the letter squares with the 
former. All the court does, or can do, is to ennounce its 
considered judgement upon the question. The only power it 
has, the power of judgement. This court neither approves nor 
condemns any legislative policy. Its delicates and difficult 
office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation 
is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the 
provisions of the constitution. 
The major problem of Australian federalism arises 
largely because the two major political parties have 
different approaches to dealing with states and local 
governments. Consequently they have different policies 
towards them. Either party coming to power is likely to undo 
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the scheme of the other. This introduces a strong element of 
uncertainity about Federal-State relations resulting in 
difficulties for long range planning cooperation between the 
federal, state and local governments is essential for better 
management and this can happen only when cordiality and good 
will exist. This unfortunately is seldom found, as party 
politics rather than pragmatic considerations dominate 
centre-state relations. The constitution convention 
initiated by the Whitlam government were genuine attempt to 
discuss constitutional problems and co study the relation 
between the different levels of government. Those 
conventions was continued by the Fraser government, but the 
meetings were mared by petty party bickerings and 
personality clashes. 
The provision of concurrent powers contained in 
section 51 of the constitution contributes to overlap of 
function and control between the federal and state 
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governments. Under this section come function like 
housing, transport social welfare, the environment and the 
regulation of the labour and economy. This overlap becomes 
an even greater problem when the central government provides 
the finances and the state governments administer the 
schemes. The resultant confusion can mean that some areas 
are neglected and there occurs 'wasteful duplication, sloppy 
administration, mutual recrimination, and the steady erosion 
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of responsible government.• 
There is indeed an imbalance in the system; the 
federal government has the money and the states have the 
responsibility. The federal government wants naturally to 
have control over how the money is spent, and the states are 
unable to plan ahead because of uncertainty about the fund 
and are unable to raise their own money. Further more more 
populous states resent the fact not their money goes to help 
the less populous states. At the same time separatist 
movements in the smaller states claim they would be better 
off if they quite the federal system altogether. 
The problems of Australian federalism are old and -are 
very likely to continue in the future. There is no 
indication to suggest that the system might be replaced by a 
unitary one. The states are too strongly entrenched in the 
frame work of the Australian life, and the chances of a 
necessary referendum being passed to this effect are nil. 
Federalism is going to remain, but what is not certain is 
the nautre of federal-state relationship; it is most likely 
to change. It is very likely that the states would be hard 
pressed to give way to fedral government in areas which 
traditionally belonged to them. They may also be required to 
raise funds to finance their own projects. 
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Another likely trend to develop is the importance of 
local governments and municipalties as a third tiers of 
government. Thus we are likely to witness pressure and 
conflicts of a three way nature rather than merely federal-
state conflicts. 
On the positive side it should be noted that 
continuation of constitutional conventions ensures the 
possibility of close scruting of federal-state relations. 
This may lead to fair distribution of responsibilities and 
resources. Since the constitutional crisis of 1975 the 
Australian have become more aware of the limitation of their 
constitution, and perhaps for a greater need for its 
change. There, is strong evidence to suggest that the two 
levels of government have come more closer to act 
cooperatively in recent years then even before. This trend 
is likely to continue, particularly becuase of the overlap 
contained in the constitution provisions. Such overlap can 
be reduced but not remained because of the dependent nature 
of development functions. This makes cooperation very vital 
between the two levels of government for successful 
operation. Such cooperation rather than confrontation is 
likely to be evolved behind close doors where politicians 
are less likely to adopt rigid party lines. 
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Canada 
Canada led the way and set the pattern for the 
establishment of a federal, parliamentary system. This was 
due to relatively advanced economy and size of the 
population. Her constititional growth continued in from the 
time much before the American Revolution took place. It is a 
fact that the American Revolution had its impact on 
developments in Canada. 
At the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775, Quebec and 
Nova Scotia were part of a single North American Empire. 
Much before the American Revolution, the American colonies 
wanted to conquer Quebec. In 1775 two american columns 
converged upon the St. lawrence, captured Montreal and 
besieged Quebec. The French Canadians resisted because of 
the fear of losing their identity in the new American 
nation, and also for fear of losing the special rights that 
they enjoyed under British rule. For the first time the 
British flag was hoisted by the people themselves over 
Quebec in challange to the Revolutionary flag of the 
americans "At the very moment of the birth of Canada, Quebec 
demonstrated its determination to stay British because it 
was French"-^  The French Revolution, however, weakened the 
emotional affiliation of conservative Quebec for its 
original motherland. 
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The treaty of Paris (1783) was actually a signal for 
the birth of two North American Nations. It recognised the 
independence of the United States and also fixed Canada's 
first Southern boundary. Pitt's Canada Act of 1791 imposed 
restrictions aimed to forestall a repetition of the american 
Revolution. It was in the Canadian context, an important 
development which illustrated the British Imperialism's 
principle of divergent degrees of self-government. 
"Representative Government was introduced in both 
Upper and Lower Canada. Because the constitution enjoyed by 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward island could 
not be denied to the new settlement in Upper Canada and 
could not be withheld from Lower Canada."^^ 
For Canada to become a nation, a prodigious effort 
would be needed to reconcile its own divergent interests and 
different races and to withstand American pressure and 
attraction. The turning in Canada's history of nationhood 
was the war of 1812 between Britain and United States over 
the right of search at Sea.'**^  The war ended after the 
Treaty of Ghent was concluded in 1814. This treaty 
reconfirmed the independence of Canada from United States.'*^  
Canada population began to increase rapidly, between 
1815-1850 it went up from half a million to three million -
mainly becuase of the inflow of British and Irish migrants. 
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Economic growth led to mutual tensions and to demands for 
self-government grew. This involved a two problems, firstly 
"relations with the imperial power; and secondly the 
question whether Canada should base her democracy on British 
or American model". ^  
A reform movement arose in both provinces of Canada in 
sympathy with the similar radical movements in Britain. In 
lower Canada it was directed against the English speaking 
"Tories" who though in minority but dominated the economic 
and political scene. 
In 1828 William Lyon Mockenzie formed the first Reform 
Government and demanded both the right of the legislature to 
control the executive and the introduction of democracy. In 
1837 rebellions broke out in both the Canadas. The cause 
being the constitutional divorce between power and 
responsibility. 
Lord Durhum was sent out as Governor-General in 1838 
to deal with the situation. After some time he submitted his 
famous Report on 31 January 1839. He proposed (1) to create 
one United Canada out of the two Canada's and to absorb the 
French into a British background; (2) the introduction of 
responsible Government; (3) the separation of local Canadian 
affairs (in which the Govener had to act on the advice of 
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Canadain Ministers) from imperial affairs (for which the 
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Governor was answerable to London). 
The Durhura Report was coolly received in Britain. In 
1840 an Act was passed to setup a single United province of 
Canada but with the same constitution as before. A long 
fight began with the Governor, who acted as politicians. 
English-speaking Canadians under Robert Baldwin and French 
speaking Canadians under Louis Lafontaine joined together to 
establish responsible parliamentary Government. 
With the repeal of Corn Laws in England in 1846, the 
british attitude changed. They introduced the free trade 
system and lost interest in control 1ing Canadian Economic 
affairs. London was now ready to accept and implement the 
Durhum Report. In 1848 Baldwin and Lafontaine won an 
election and formed the first responsible government, on 
Canadian soil. 
Even before 1848 a movement had begun and gathered 
momentum to form a Union of all Canadian provinces. The main 
driving force behind this move was the complex relationship 
of Canada with Britain and the United States. 
There were two strong factors responsible for the more 
towards union. One was the bitterness between the Britishers 
and the French people. John Macdonals concluded that the 
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best solution was to create two separate provinces, and to 
find a way of keeping them united. The other factor was the 
fear that Britain would sacrifice Canadians economic 
interests to United States. Canada wanted to become 
powerful enough to look after her own Interests. 
There was considerable U.S. pressure against Canadian 
federation. General Nathanial P. banks sponsored an 
annexation bill in congress in 18 66; an agent was sent to 
the Maritime provinces to influence local legislatures to 
vote against Union with Canada; the Senate foreign relations 
committee passed a resolution expressing apprehensions that 
a rival confederation was going to be formed upon monarchial 
principles. The legislature "under the influence of a rail 
road promoter, who was seeking to bring the neighbouring 
province of New Brunswick under his control, resolved that 
Canadian federation was a violation of the Monroe 
doctrine."^^ 
In 1866 the U.S. Government denounced the Reciprocity 
Treaty for increasing the pressure upon Canada. As a result 
England changed its attitude and in 1854 backed federation 
so that Canada should become strong enough to defend herself 
opened up the Middle west in order to check American designs 
on the pacific coast. 
re 
The obstacles in the way of Canadian union were 
formidable Vancouver island and British Columbia were the 
only outposts and linked only by sea with the rest of the 
country and with the out side world. They were separated by 
2000 miles of mountains and plains from the mainland. The 
first continental train could not pass through them till 
1886. The Maritime provinces wanted their own railway 
continued to have their economic relations with New England. 
The first definite step towards federation was the 
adoption of the Quebec Resolutions in 1864 by a conference 
of delegates from Canada, Nova Scotia and New brunswick. 
These resolution recorded the resolve to build the new 
federal structure upon a model of the British constitution. 
The following year this determination was confirmed by the 
French - Speaking Canadians of lower Canada who declarated 
that the proposed federation should remain a "British 
colony, in which they had secured equal rights and 
Parliamentary democracy. The Quebec Resolution were adopted 
in province of Canada but rejected, by Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick. In 1865 Tilley fought an election in New 
Brunswick to support federation and lost.'*^  
The new constitution was framed at the Westminister 
conference in 1866. The American device of residual powers 
to the States was rejected because it had helped bring in 
5b 
the American civil war. The federal Government had the same 
parliamentary form and the same degree of responsible 
government as the colonies that composed it, and it was 
based on the Durham Report. 
The original federation consisted of Ontario and 
Quebec (as the two parts of the former United Province were 
now called), Nova Scotia and New brunswick, Monitoba was 
constituted a province in 1870 and British Columbia (still 
without railway contact with the east) in 1871; Province 
Edward Island in 1873; Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905. New 
foundland become the tenth Province in 1959. The background 
of Canadian federation was different from the other 
federations. The urge was more internal then external, but 
there was both an internal and an external reason for the 
particular form which Canadian federation assumed. 
The principle of the distribution of powers under the 
Canadian system is, the antithesis of the United States. In 
Canada the powers of the provinces are enumerated, the 
"reserve of powers" being left with the federation so that, 
though a list of the powers of the Idt.ter is actually given 
in the original Act of 1867, this is only for the sake of 
greater clarity and not to diminish the federal power. The 
grant of powers to the provinces Is considerable, including 
such matters, as the amendment of their own constitutions 
5V 
(except that it may not abolish the office of Leiutenant-
Governor) , direct taxation within the province, the 
administration of justice, and the control of municipal 
government within the province. 
Canada has a Governor-General, appointed nominally by 
the Crown but actually by the British government with the 
concurrence of the Government of the Dominion. The members 
of the Senate are not elected but nominated for life, and 
not by the province, but by the Dominion Government as 
vacancies occur. Further, the Governor General in Canada 
may, on the advice of the Dominion Government, Veto an Act 
of a provincial parliament. 
So far as the judiciary is concerned, there is a 
Supreme Court in Canada, but it has no power to interpret 
the constitution. 
The problem of constitutional amendment is more 
complex and difficult in Canada then in any other 
federation. This is due to the fact that, although it was 
written, the Canadian constitution contained no provision 
for its own amendment.48 
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Chapter - 2 
GENESIS OF FEDERALISM 
IN INDIA 
The Historical Background 
There is much truth in Mr. Graham Walla's observation: 
"We have become biologically more fitted to live with the 
help of our social heritage, and biological^yless Fitted, to 
live without it. We have become, one may say, biologically 
parasitic upon our social heritage". Our present social 
structure is to a very great extent the slow and 
imperceptible evolution of the ancient state. 
Relying on various sources, an attempt is made here to 
give a brief account of the growth of the Indian polity. 
Only in so far as it is concerned with the evolution of 
federalism within the many kingdoms which existed in India. 
In ancient India a village was the primary unit of 
administration. It enjoyed local freedom under an elected 
sarpanch who was elected by all adults. The panchayat 
exercised great influence on the social and political life 
of the villages. The headman was responsible for security of 
the villagers against outside attacks for this he was at 
liberty to enter into alliance with neighbouring villagers. 
A number of villages joined together to maintian works of 
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common utility such as inter-village bridges and roads ets. 
^ut the village, when they freely to combined for common 
purposes remain absolutely independent of each other. "For 
such purposes usually there were conbinations of ten 
villages, and ten such combinations formed bigger alliances 
of hundred village."^ Inspite of these alliances, the 
village headman was directly under the authority of the 
Kingdom.-^  When alliances were thus formed, the head of the 
Union was an selected person. His native village usually 
had the prime position among other the village of the union. 
The whole of India was, however, divided in to many 
Kingdoms, big and small. Some times nn ambitious king of a 
powerful kingdome subjugation of other kingdoms. 
There is another point to be remembered about the 
status of the smaller kingdoms. All of them had not equal 
status within the Empire. There were some treated by the 
Emperor on a footing of equality, while others were mere 
vassars and subordinate alliance to their overlord. These 
Kingdoms had the different forms of government, some were 
democratic others were either oligarchies of monarchies. 
These status made allainces with each other to achieve 
common goals. Some times a weaker king formed an alliance 
with a tronger one to protect his k Lngdom and became the 
latter's subordinate ally, as the king of Kamrup did under 
es 
Harsha.^ The smaller states themselves used to became 
integral parts of a bigger empire to reap "the fruits of the 
resulting union." Thus Chandragupta had no difficulty in 
annexing the states of Northern Indin within his Empire of 
Magadh, and established centralised imperial system. But 
this centralisation did not bring about the loss of 
independence of the weaker states as it did not result into 
a unitary state. Nor was there a federal system with clear 
cut division of government powers between the centre and 
the state governments. 
Under the Moghals 
With Babur's victory at panipat in 152 6 bagan Moghal 
rule in India which lasted upto 1857. The first six Moghal 
Emperors succeed each other and ruled over the country from 
Delhi. The chief cause of their success was the principal 
of hereditary succession. Unlike Afghans who preceded them. 
It was when Aurangzeb tried to scuttle this srpjlncipal by 
defeating Dara and Shuja, weakness in the empire set in and 
the later Moghals lose power over the provincial 
governments. 
Akbar who built up an all India Empire. By his policy 
of conciliation, matrimonial alliances, and by religious 
tollerance he realised his ambition, at least in Northern 
India, by winning the allegiance of the Rajputs. He evolved 
a highly centralised system of administration which unified 
India. It was a great achievement. The Emperor became the 
focal point of the entire administration. The provincial 
governors looked for his guidance in day to day 
administration. It is true that the governors enjoyed 
greart influence in the provincea but the Emperor's 
'firmans' had to be obeyed. The Emperor, by appointed the 
provincial subedars or governors and assigned them the 
provincial military quotas and frequently transferred the 
subedars and forces from one suba to another established, a 
kind of centralised despotism. Inspite of all this the 
central authority left the villages untouched and there was 
local autonomy. 
The Hindu empires in ancient India had of local rulers 
who owed allegiance to the Empire byt were independent in 
their internal administration. The Moghal Empire, on the 
other hand, was centralised and divided into provinces under 
Nazims or Subedars appointed directly from Delhi. The 
Subedar had to enforce the royal decrees and regulations 
sent to him could not issue contrary regulations. There was 
one more difference, between the ancient and Moghal period 
and that was the village headman in ancient India was 
directly responsible to the central authority. But in the 
time of the Moghals this had entirely changed. 
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The British Raj and the first Breath of Federalism 
In the 17th century came the East India Company, not 
for building an Empire but for trade^ with this country. 
War in Europe in the 18th century, however, impelled 
Europeans in india to seek allies among Indian Princes and 
to interference in Indian politics. The decay of Moghal 
power brought with it the independence of Subedars. With the 
defeat of Nawab Sirajuddola of Bengal at the Battle of 
Plassey (1757) by Clive, the East India Company became one 
of the leading power in india. The confirment of Diwany 
rights of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, by- the 
Moghal Emperor in 1765, put the company on a path to power. 
The cases of misappropriation, cruelty and oppression by the 
company attracted the attention of the British Parliament. 
The enquiries which followed led to the passing of the 
Regulating Act of 1773.^ It was the first attempt of the 
British Parliament to control the company and its employees 
in India. A Supreme Court was established in Calcutta to 
administer justice and formed a strong and solid security 
for the Indians.^ 
The Regulating Act created a Governor-General, who was 
powerless before his own Council, and an Executive that was 
powerless before a Supreme Court, itself immune from all 
6^ 
responsibility for the peace of the country. Pitt's Act of 
1784 established the Supreme executive authority of six 
Parliamentary Commissioners for Indian affairs. It was known 
as the Borad of Control, and thus created the dual system of 
government one by the company and the other by a 
Parliamentary Board which continued till after the Mutiny^^: 
The Act of 1786 strengthened the position of the Governor-
General by empowering him to override his counil. The Act of 
1773 further extended the power of the Governor-General over 
the several governments and Presidencies.^^ 
The Act of 183 3 was passed to end the monopoly of the 
company and open the trade for free operation of British 
Capital and interprise.-^^ The Act vested in the Governor-
General-in-Council the powers of superintendence, direction 
and control of the entire civil and military government- of 
all the territories and to make laws for all persons and 
courts of justice. The Presidency government's powers of 
legislation were drastically cut and they were left only 
with the right of proposing legislation to the Governor-
General-in-Council. A law member whose duties was added to 
the central council. Previous sanction of the Governor-
General was now required for the creation of a new post, or 
grant of salary gratuity, or allowance. 
This highly centralised system of government was 
e 
produced frictions between the local and the central 
government. To remedy this situation, the Act of 1853 
provided for the inclusion of representative members from 
the sister presidencies, on the Governor-Generals 
Council. ^-^ 
The Act of 1853 also consolidated the government of 
Indian's control over income and expenditure. The office of 
a separate Lieutent-Governor to administer Begnal, was also 
created. On the first occasion free trade was introduced 
under this Act.^ '* 
In 1854 the Governor-General in Council was empowered 
with the consent of the Board of Directors, and the Board of 
control to take under his control any territory under the 
government of the East India company. 
The first great rebellion against the British broke 
out in India in 1857. It symbolised, "the contemporary 
summation of the people's discontents, in the army and 
elsewhere."^ 
The ability of European officers to comprehend the 
reaction of the Indians was no more to be taken for granted. 
The reforms with a view to conciliating the masses and "to 
obliterate distinction between the conquerors and the 
conquered in India" were considered necessary. It was 
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realized that the stability of the British rule could best 
be ensured by providing for greater association of Indians 
within the administration. An Act for Better Government of 
India, passed on 2nd August, 1857 abolished the dual system 
of administration and transferred all territories, and 
powers of the East India Company to the Queen. A secretary 
of state with a council was appointed to manage Indian 
affairs. The structure of government in India and the 
overriding powers of the Governor-General of supervision and 
control however remained intact. 
After the rebellion of 1857 'decentralization' came to 
be discussed as a basis for administrative changes in India. 
Decentralization had become inevitable due to the conflicts 
between the central and the local governments, apathy of 
local governments towards to economy, and the growing burden 
of governmental work. Political expendiency of associating 
the Indians with government for enabling the latter to know 
the public feeling before discontent flared up into open 
revolt. ^"^  
Several proposals for decentralization were discussed 
but it was only in 1870 that a real step was taken by the 
Governor General Lord Mayo-^ °, when certain financial powers 
were given to the provinces. The scheme was adopted through 
a Resolution dated 14th December 1870 (No.3334) and came 
£9 
into force in April 1871. It transferred for the first time 
certain services to be designated as "provincial services' 
to the pr^inces. A fixed annual grant, less by a million 
than the budget provision for these heads in 1870-71, was 
assigned to the Local Governments which were free to 
distribute the grant between these heads at their 
discretion.^^ "The provinces were to get the departmental 
receipts, and were allowed to meet the expenses from local 
2 0 
sources also." 
I t must be noted t h a t 1870 measures were only 
concerned with pub l ic e x p e n d i t u r e . Revenue heads were 
t r a n s f e r r e d in 1877 during t h e term of Lord Lytton as 
Governor-General. Responsibil i ty of land Revenue, Excise 
stamps. General Administration and Law the Jus t i ce was given 
to the provinces and they were en t i t l ed to income from 
c e r t a i n heads, i . e . , excise, stamps, l icence (income) tax , 
law and j u s t i c e , in addition to an adjusting imperial Grant 
in case of d e f i c i t . ^ 
But the problem of exactly adjusting resources to 
needs remained, s ince t he revenue r e c e i p t s from t h e 
t ransfer red heads were insuf f ic ien t and had to be raised by 
a subvention from the Centre. ^^ In 1882 the pr inciple of 
Divided Head of Revenue, was extended from Assam to other 
p rov inces a l s o . Under t h i s head revenue r e c e i p t s were 
7t) 
divided between the centre, and the provinces in proportions 
fixed at quinquennial settlements until 1904, when the 
arrangement was made permanent. Land revenue, excise, income 
tax, stamps registration and forests, were put under this 
head.23 
The Indian Council Act of 1892 regarded as first step 
on the road to federalism. The idea was to establish local 
councils all over the country. This Act brought about some 
decentralization in the ligistative sphere aslo . The Act 
provided for a large non-official contingent in the Indian 
ligistatures through indirect election. These legislatures 
had a right of discussing the budget with out voting. In 
actual practice, the provincial legislature could pass laws 
relating to local subjects. 
In 1904 Lord Curzon introduced a system of quasi-
permanent settlements. "Under this new system the revenue 
assigned to a provincial Government were definitely fixed, 
and were not subject to change by the Government of India 
except in the case of emergency. Under the newly devised 
famine Insurance Scheme, the Government of India placed to 
the credit of each famine-prone province, a fixed amount, 
calculated roughly on the basis its estimated famine 
liabilities. When this fund was exhausted, further 
expenditure was to be shared equally by the Central and 
7< 
provincial Governments. In 1917 this arrangement was changed 
and made famine relief expenditure a divided head." 
For maintenance of the integrity of the British 
Empire, and to serve as a safety vrtlve, Allan 0. Hume, a 
liberal British Civil Servant^ '*, helped to organise the 
Indian National Congress, holding its first meeting in 
Bombay. There were gathered 72 English-educated prominent 
citizens to discuss Indian affairs. Congress passed 
resolutions to requesting redress of Indian grievances, it 
also persued anti-Russian propaganda. The presidential 
addresses usually began with a grateful acknowledgement of 
the blessings conferred by British rule on India.. But the 
Congress alarmed the British bureaucracy as early and in 
1890, a circular was issued forbiden government officials to 
desist from attending congress sessions even as visitors. 
In November 1905 when Lord Minto replaced Lord Curzon 
as viceroy of India the country was surging under deep 
discontent. The "partition of Bengal' (October 1905)^ , 
Universities Act of 1904^^, the costly Durbars^^, the 
hostility to elected element in local bodies^^, and the 
expensive Tibetan expedition were all ill-conceived actions 
of Curzon which had created discontent in the country. The 
defeat of russia by Japan (1904-5) and the first Russian 
Revolution, "opened the flood-gates of the peoples movement. 
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and India began realy to awake". In 1905 national movement 
entered into a new phase and ""moderates' like s.N. Banerjea, 
Pherozeshah, Mehta, G.K. Gokhale and Dadabhai Naoroji could 
not keep pace with events that occured from 1905 onwards. 
Since 1892, there had been a considerable expansion of 
Western education among the middle class. A large number of 
educated Britishers and India upper class and dominated the 
Congress. This newly-educated class demanded parliamentary 
institutions and "feeling themselves betrayed by the 
moderates, who merely by being moderate, were lackeys of the 
British and who could anyway, being without financial 
worries afford to wait-they turned to revolutionary 
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Violence"-^" It was under these new nationalists leaders that 
large demonstrations, new "boycott' and Swadeshi were 
organized in 1905 when Bengal was partitioned. 
Democratization of the House of Commons had resulted 
in the emergence of "Directing influence of political life 
at home" which were "simultaneously in full accord with the 
advance of political thought in India. "•^•'• 
The "cast iron bureaucracy' which had always insisted 
that what India realy needed was a strong despotic 
administration to the inclusion of all institutions of 
representative, Lord Minto and Lord Morley hastened to 
ensure that the initiative in considering further 
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constitutional reform emanated at Governmental level and 
that its hands did not appear to have been forced" by 
agitation in this country or by pressure from home". An 
equally weighty reason for the Morley-Minto Reforms lay in 
the official desire to strengthen the moderate elements in 
Congress by conceding concessions to them, while extremist 
activities were being forcibly stamped out. ^  
•J 
Administrative Expendiency 
"Under Lord Curzon department after department, 
service after service had been overhauled. Principles were 
enunciated and standards set. New department or new 
authorities were created.... All this resulted into 
concentration of authority in the Central Government, 
against which a natural reaction in due occured. In 
addition, provincial governments were beignning to function 
under financial and administrative constraints. The high 
degree of centralization under Lord Curzon resulted into 
enormous increase in the work at the central secretariat. In 
the Home Department, correspondance had doubled between 1891 
and 1902. Hence the necessity was felt of relieving the 
centre of the burden of administration. 
In view of factors cited above. Lord Minto, with .the 
full knowledge and approval of the secretary of state. 
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followed Lord Dufferin's example in appointing Sir Arundel, 
Sir Denzil Ibbetson, Mr. Erie Richarns, and Mr. Baker in 
1906, to consider, the increases of representative 
elements in the Indian and provincial Legislative Council. 
The committee's report by the Secretary of State, the 
tentative reform outlined in the Home Department letter No. 
2310-7, dated 24th August, 1907, was sent to the provincial 
for comments and also invited public opinion on the subject. 
In its despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 1st 
October, 1908, the Government of India communicated an 
exhaustive account of the proposed reforms. The Secretary of 
State sent his decision to the Government of India in 
November 1908. 
The Decentralization Commission 
While the discussion for further reforms was going on, 
a commission was appointed under the Chairmanship of Sir 
Henry William Primrose by British Government to enquire into 
the problem of decentralization. The Decentralization 
Commission submitted its report in February 1909. Lord 
Morley, the Secretary of State, justified his proposal for 
reforms amounting to "admission of the Indians to a larger 
and more direct share in the Government of their country 
without for a moment taking from the central govt, its 
VJ 
authority", on grounds of their indispensability "to fortify 
the foundations" of British rule in India. He declared 
unequivocally that a parliamentary system in India is not at 
all the goal to which I would for ono moment aspire. 
The Decentralization Commission held the view "that 
the provincial Governments should be subject in all respects 
to the general control of the government of India, though, 
the future policy should be directed to the enlargement of 
the spheres of detailed administration entrusted to the 
-J c 
provinces." "^  
The Morley-Minto Reforms 
In early 1909 Lord Morley introduced the Indian 
Council Bill which was passed on May 25, 1909 came into 
operation on 15th November 1909. The Act abandoned official 
majority in the provincial Councils and enlarged the Indian 
Legislative Council with a provision of nomination and 
reservation of seats for minorities and special interests. 
The Act empowered the Councils to discuss the budget at 
length and to propose resolutions and to divide upon the 
budget and all matters of general public importance. 
However, the resolutions had little efficacy as they were 
meant to operate as recommendations to executive government. 
The Reforms of 1909 failed to meet the demands of the 
Indian nationalists. The conception of a responsible 
7o 
executive wholly or partially amenable to the elected 
Councils, was not conceded. Power remained with the 
government and the Councils had no functions but to 
criticise. The Morley-Minto Reforms' did not usher any new 
policy, they were a just an extention of the existing 
system. The executive government retained the power of final 
decision on all questions,* 
In 1918 the Montague-Chelmsfcrd report said, "in nine 
years the Morley-Minto Reforms have spent their utility. 
They are no longer acceptable to Indian Opinion and official 
opinion also views them with a critical eye. 
Post-War Nationalism 
The War that broke-out in 1914 had its impact not only 
in India politics but also in Britain's position in the 
world and inside Britain herself.-^ ^ 
By combining political action with Hindu revivalism 
and converting it into a new nationalism Bal Gangadhar Tilak 
(1856-1920) "gave to Indian nationalism and in particular to 
Congress a sense of urgent militancy and an aim — that of 
Swaraj, or independence — which was much more positive than 
the colonial-self-government which was all that the moderate 
leaders of his time had hoped for.-^ ^ There was a short-lived 
n 
cooperation between Muslims and the Congress when Britain 
delcared war on Turkey. The delcaration in 1917 by Woodrow 
Wilson declared that the aim of the war was to guarantee 
self-determination to all peoples-'^, compelling the British 
Government into promising representative institutions to 
India after the War was over, very significant development 
which changed the tenor of India National Movement. The 
appearance of Mahatma Gandhi, and Ali Brothers as leaders, 
who could rally all the warring elements in Indian politics 
- provided to for Congress the sources of the mass support -
was the most striking development at the Indian political 
40 scene. 
Meanwhile friction between Hindus and Muslims had been 
growing apace. The foundation of the Muslim League had done 
much to integrate Muslim policy. Being in the minority in 
most areas south of the Ganges, they were extremely 
apprehensive of the biased intention of congress to control 
all councils. One way of resisting such a design was for the 
Muslim to insist an separate electoral rolls from the 
Hindus. By the Lucknow Pact in 1916 differences were 
temporarily sunk by congress conceding the principle of 
seperated electorates.^^ 
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Chapter - 3 
THE BASIS OF MODERN INDIAN FEDERALISM - THE 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF, 1919 
As a result of all these events. On August 20, 1917 
the Secretary of state for India made the follow'ing 
announcement in the House of commons:^ 
"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with the 
Government of India are in complete accord, is that of 
increasing association of Indians in every branch of 
the administration and the gradual development of self-
governing institutions with a view to the progressive 
realisation of responsible government in India as an 
integral part of the British Empire.... I would add 
that progress in the policy can only be achieved by 
successive stages. The British Government and the 
Government of India, must be Judges of the time and 
measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the 
co-operation received from those upon whom new 
opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by 
the extent to which it is found that confidence can be 
reposed in their sense of responsibility " 
On June 2, 1919 after a careful study of the several 
reports and despatches, the Government of India Bill was 
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introduced in the House of Commons.^ 
In most respects the bill sought to translate into law 
the scheme of the Montague—Chelmsform Report. A Joint 
parliamentary Committee under the chairmanship of Lord 
Salborne, went into the details of the Bill and submitted 
its report in November 1919. The Bill became an Act on 
December 23, 1919 and came into full operation in 1921. 
The Govt, of Indian Act of 1919 provided for a basic 
federal structure with out namir^ it. Under the new Act the 
administrative subjects were divided under the "Central" 
and "Provincial" Categories. The provincial subjects were 
further divided into Reserved and transferred half. The 
reserved subjects were to administered by the Governor while 
the transferred subjects were placed in the hands of Indian 
Ministers. Since the Ministers were to be responsible to the 
legislature, it became necessary to restrict the powers of 
the Secretary of state in regard to the administration of 
subjects under "Transferred" head. The Act, hence, empowered 
the Secretary of state to make rules and regulations to 
the extent it might be necessary to give effect to the 
Provincial part of the Act'*. The rules made by him 
restricted his control over the transferrd subjects for the 
purpose of (1) Safeguarding the interests of the Empire, 
(2) Deciding controversial issues between provinces, 
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(3) Safeguarding the due exercise of power and discharge of 
duties imposed upon the Governor Gineral in council by the 
Act. (4) Safeguarding the administrations of central 
subject as well as to protect the interest of the minorities 
community in India. The objective of Act was to gradualy 
introduce responsible democratic government in the provinces. 
We can say that this Act of 1919 was the major step 
towards the development of federal system.^ 
The Act of 1919 did not bring about any fundamental 
change in composition and powers of the Governor General 
and Central Executive Council. He remained responsible to 
the British Parliament through the Secretary of State as 
before. The suprintendence, direction and control of entire 
administration still vested in him. Although he was 
required to take all decisions in his Excutive Council, his 
pre-eminent position in the council remained intact, because 
of being crown's representative in India. Secondly he had a 
powerful say in the appointment of his councillors . 
The Act of 1919 set up a bi-cameral legistature at the 
centre as legislative Assembly and council of State, having 
145 members and 60 members respectively. Both the chambers 
had a majority of elected members. Out of 14 5 members in 
the Assembly 41 were nominated members and the rest were 
elected. 
Changes in the provincial setup. 
The Act of 1919 reoriented the provincial structure by 
introducing 'dyarchy". This system was unique. The word 
"dyarchy" is a compound of "Di" which means authorities or 
double Government. For the first time during the British 
rule, provinces Secured the Semblance of responsible and 
Quasi federal government. 
The new Act divided clearly the subjects to be 
administered by the Centre and the provines . The provincial 
subjects were further divided into halvoa Reserved and 
Transferred halves. The Reserved subjects were controlled by 
the Governor and his executive council whose members had no 
responsibility to the legislative Council. The Transferred 
subjects were administered by the Governor with the help if 
Indian Ministers who were responsible to the legislature. 
This dual arrangement in the provincial executive came to be 
known as dyarchy. 
Before dealing with dyarchical system in detail, it is 
worthwhile to consider the underlying principles of the 
division of subjects between the centre and provinces. The 
matters of all- India importance which required uniformity 
of policy were treated as Central subjects. The Central list 
Contained 47 such subjects, Most important-among there were: 
8^ 
Defence, foreign affairs, Political Relations with native 
states; Patents and copyrighl; Currency and Coinage; 
Communications; Commerce and Shipping; Excise duties on 
cotton; Salt; Incometax and Public debt in India. The 
subjects which were mainly of local Concern were treated as 
provincial subject. The Provincial list Contained 50 
subjects including local self-Goverment, Public Health; 
Sanitation and Medical Administration, Education, Public 
works. Water supplies and irrigation. Famine Relief, 
Forests, co-operative Societies, Law and order etc. The Act 
also stated that if the Governor-General-in-Council declared 
any Central subjects as of Provincial interest, then the 
Provincial Legislature would be empowered to make laws 
pertaining to that subject. 
The Subjects to be dealt with by the Provincial 
Goverments were subdivided into two parts - Reserved "and 
Transfered. In the word of Montford - Report the Principle 
underlying the division was "to include within transferred 
Subjects those departments which afforded most opportunity 
for local knowledge and Social Service, those in which 
Indian had shown themselves to be keenly interested, those 
in which mistakes that may occur, though serious, would not 
be irremediable and those which stand most in need of 
development.^ The reserved list included police. Land 
Revenue Administration, Justice, Irrigation and canals. 
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Famine Relief, Contrl of Newspapers, Borrowing Forests, etc. 
The subjects included in the transferred list were Local 
Self - Goverment, Public Health, Sanitation and Medical 
Administration, Education public works including Roads, 
bridges and tramways, fisheries excise. Technical Education 
and agriculture, etc. The administration of reserved 
subjects was Controlled by the Governor with the Co -
operation of his councillors. For the good governance of 
reserved subjects the Governor was answerable not to the 
voters of the Province but to the Parliament through the 
Governor - General and Secretary of State. As to dispute 
whether a particualr subject was rested or transferred the 
dicision of the Governor General was to be final. 
Dyarchy 
In the preceding section we have already discussed how 
the provincial matters were split into two groups reserved 
and transferred, controlled by two sets of persons 
responsible to two different authorities. Let us now deal 
with dyarchy or double goverment in provinces in greater 
detail. 
The Act provided for the appointment of Ministers to 
help the Government in dealing with the transferrd subjects. 
The maximum number of Minister to be appointed in various 
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provinces was fixed by the Act. Bombay, Calcutta and Madras 
had three Ministers each while the remaining provinces had 
only two Ministers each. The Ministers were selected by the 
Governor to hold office during his pleasure, from among the 
non-official member of the provincial legisltui;e. 
Membership of the legislature was essential for becoming a 
Minister. If a person at the time of his appointment did not 
happen to be a member of the legislature, he could not hold 
ministerial position for more than six months. 
The reponsibility of Ministers to the provincial 
legislature was further secured by another measure. Besides 
refusing to sanction grant for the Minister's salary, the 
legislature was also empowered to demand a Minister's 
resignation by expressing lack of Confidence in him. Thus 
the Governer's choice of Minister was limited only to those 
persons who Commanded the support of a majority in the 
legisjatures. There was no discrimination between a 
Minister and a member of executive council in so far as 
their status and salaries were concerned, but as regards 
position and tenure of office the. Minister was at a great 
disadvantage. He had to please two masters the Governor and 
the legislature. 
Normally in a parliamentary government the head of the 
state enjoys only nominal powers. He has to work on the 
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advice of his Ministers. Judged in this light, the provinces 
were far from getting full parliamentary or responsible 
goverment. 
To guide the Governor in his relation to the Minister 
an Instrument of Instruction was issued to the Governer. The 
Goverment of India Bill 1919 Contained the provision, "in 
relation to transferrd subjects, the Governor shall be 
guided by the advice of his Ministers, Unless he sees 
sufficient cause to dissent from their opinion, in which 
case he may require action to be taken otherwise then in 
accordance with the advice. The joint parliamentary 
committee observed, "The committe is of the opinion that 
the Ministers selected by the Governor to advise him on .the 
transferred subjects should be elected members of the 
Legisltive Council, enjoying its confidence and capable of 
leading it. A Minister shall have the option of resigning if 
his advice is not accepted by the Governor; and the Governor 
will have the ordinary constituLonal right of dismissing a 
Minister whose policy he believes to be seriously at fault 
or out of accord with the views of the Legislative council. 
In the last resort the governer could always dissolve his 
Legislative council and choose new Minister after a fresh 
election but if this course is adopted, the committee hopes 
that the Governor will find himself able to accept such 
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views as his new Ministers may press upon him regarding the 
issue which forced the dissolution®. The joint parliamentary 
committee, therefore, urged that, the Ministers who enjoyed 
the confidence of a majority in the Legislative council, 
should be given the fullest opportunity of managing the 
Department entrusted to their charge. The Governor should 
accept their advice and promote their policy to the farthest 
extent possible. "It will be for him". Observed the 
Committee to help with sympathy and courage the popular 
side of his government in their new responsibilities. The 
Commitee was fully seized of the fact that Minister in 
India, as in all other countries, would commit mistakes, 
acting with the approval of a majority of the Legislature 
council but there is no way learning except through 
experience and by the realisation of reponsibility. ^ 
It is noteworthy that the Goverment of India Act,1919 
entrusted the Governor with many special responsibilities. 
Discharging his special responsibilities, the Governor could 
disagree with his Minister on any significant matter. In 
this way without violating the Act of 1919 could have his 
way. 
In practice the Minister were far from being the real 
masters of their departments. The v/ere not free agents. 
They had to submit to the wishes of the Governor who could 
so 
even ignore the advice of a Minister and act in his 
discretion if he considered it necessary in the interest of 
minorities, the depressed classes and Public services. 
Though the authors of the Act had expected the Governor to 
encourage the principle of joint responsibility amongst the 
Ministers, by deliberating with them in a body, no such 
thing was practised by the Governors. The Governors 
generally dealt with the Ministers individually and thus 
hampered the growth of team amongst them. The Ministers 
were found criticising each other openly and looking up to 
the Governor for their nomination to the executive Council 
at the end of their term. 
The administration of reserved Subjects was vested 
exclusively in the Governor-in-Council. The membership of 
executive Council of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras was four 
each while that for other provinces only two each. Although 
the Act said nothing about the inclusion of Indians in the 
Council, the Governors developed a convention of nominating 
Indians to the extent of 50 percent of the total strength of 
the council. The Indian Councillors were taken from out 
side the official group. Thus effect was given to the 
principle stated in August Declaration of Montague of 
associating more and more Indians in the administration of 
the country. 
91 
The members of the Governor's Executive Council were 
appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the 
Governor. Evidently every Councillor owed his appointment 
to the Governor. Unlike the Ministers, they could not be 
removed by the legislature's motion of censure or non-
confidence. Jhe Governor who had the duty under the 
Instrument of Instructions of maintaining the safety and 
tranquillity in the state and also the standered of good 
administration, was given extensive power to discharge this 
function. He acted as the head of the council in which 
matters were decided by a majority vote but he could also 
over-rule the majority. 
Achievements of Dyarchy: 
The novel experiment of dyarchy in the provinces 
remained in operation for nearly sixteen years and was 
replaced finally by full provincial automany in 1935. In 
spite of its serious drawbacks, it was not altogether barren 
of good results. Dyarchy brought many Indian politicians in 
touch with problems of administration and trained them in 
the art of self-government. It served as a bridge between 
unitary and federal systems. It hastened the pace of .the 
country towards provincial autonomy. Besides its educative 
value, it gave the legislators an opportunity to look into 
the working of the Government and also to criticize its 
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policies. The speeches by the Swarajist members, both in the 
House and without, focussed the attention of the people to 
unjust laws and wicked intention of the ruling race. The 
fear of their criticism did have some salutary effect on the 
executive. Above all, the steady opposition to dyarchical 
system ensured progress towards provincial autonomy, which 
is the essense of federalism. 
Another gain of dyarchy was that the Ministers got the 
opportunity to deal with the social evils without any fear 
of popular opposition. Two concrete steps taken to 
eradicate certain social evils were the passing of the Hindu 
Religious Endowment Act in Madras and Children's Act in 
Bengal. The Minister also did some good work in the field 
of education, sanitation and local government. 
Dyarchy brought about a radical changes in the 
outlook of the British bureaucracy. With the introduction 
of the partially responsible government in the provinces, a 
beginning was made towards the Indianisation of public 
services. In order to make the share of Indians in 
government real, Lord Sinha was made Governor of Bihar and 
Orissa. 
The system of Joint responsibility worked in different 
ways an with varying degree of success in different 
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provinces. Practically there ariose no trouble in U.P. and 
Madras for the first two years. The Minister shared the 
government with the Councillors and remained responsible to 
the Legislature. Sri S.N. Bannerji who had been a Minister 
for Local Self-Government in Bengal writes in his 
autobiography that dyarchy did not fail in his province, -the 
reason being both Lord Ronaldshay and Lord Lytton were 
statesman like in their attitude of sympathy and help, and 
stood by the Ministers with their generous support. They 
acted as constitutional sovereigns and made no distinction 
between executive councillors and Ministers. 
The princile of federalism of guranteed provincial 
autonomy was introduced, though unintentionally, into the 
Indian political system under the scheme of dyarchy which 
was a cardinal feature of the Government of India Act of 
1919. Provincial autonomy consists in the freedom of the 
provincial Government from central control by the Government 
of India and its becoming responsible to an elected 
legislature in the province itself. Dyarchy gave to the 
provincial government both these characteristic to a certain 
extent and it was because of this reason that the political 
system become partially federal. 
The important changes introduced by the Government of 
India Act of 1919, deserved to be noticed in this context. 
In the first place, it provided through a member of 
Devolution Rules framed under its authority and approved by 
both houses of parliament for a precise demarcation of the 
field central and provincial governments. Under the 
previously existing system of delegation such demarcation 
had no statutory basis. It was liable to be atte^ed by the 
unileteral action of the Government of India. The 
dem^cation under the Government of India Act 1919 was 
statutory in character and it could be altered only with "the 
approval of both houses of parliament. It was somewhat 
similar to the division of power made by the constitution 
itself in a federation. •'• 
Dyarchy was certainly a marched towards federation. 
The change was now internationally recognised and India was 
admitted to the League of Nations. It seemed that something 
like dominion status was just round the corner. But in spite 
of these favourable omens the Hindu Muslim situation was 
deteriorating very rapidly. These served to inflame public 
opinion still further and led to rioting and bloodshed. 
When elections to the new Montford Councils took 
place, congress refused to cooperate. The result of this 
action was ivo fold. On the one hand the councils were more 
homogeneous and liberal than expected (which no doubt gave 
the Dyarchy system an appearance of working better than in 
35 
fact it did)> On the other hand, the planned educative 
experience of running democratic government misfired. 
Communal tension was growing through the 1920s. 
In 1926 Lord Irwin took office finding it impossible 
to divert Indian opinion from politics he decided to ask for 
a committee visit India to examine the working of the 
system. Ac^rdingly a seven man purely Parliamentary 
commission under Sir John Simon was sent out such a 
commission could not by its nature include any Indian, but 
this was not understood. 
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Chapter - 4 
Various Proposals 
The non-coperation of Congress with the government 
in working out the Act of 1919 had enabled the communal 
organizations to inter legislatures and accept government 
offices. The transferred subjects of the provincial 
Governments were virtually administered from 1922 to 1937 by 
Indians who did not belong to the largest and the most 
representative party of India-Congress. It is hard to 
speculate as to what might have happened if congress had co-
oprated with the government from the beginning. This co-
operation might have prevented the growth of Hindu communal 
parties. The growth of Hindu communalism from 1923 to 1927 
aroused more fears among the Muslim politicians and changed 
their attitude towards the Hindus and congress. 
Muslim politics in these years was at a cross-
roads. The All-India Khilafat Committee lost it purpose in 
1924 when the Caliphate was abolished. It continued for 
some years and then receded into oblivion. Some of its 
Muslim members joined Congress and came to be called the 
Nationalist Muslims. Some joined the Muslim league and the 
rest drifted towards more orthodox organisations. The 
muslim League, which had since 1919 been over-shadowed by 
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the Khilafat Committee, was revived in 1924, but it was too 
weak to function as an effective organization. Over a dozen 
Muslim organisations, national and provincial, had sprung 
up. Hence, to ascertain Muslim opinion on national issues, 
it was necessary to hold an All-Parties Muslim Conference. 
Jinnah, the ablest among the Muslim leaders, had drifted 
away from Congress since 1920 but he was still a 
nationalist. He had a long and close association with, and 
a great hold over, the Hindu community of Bombay. His young 
second wife, Ruttenbai Jinnah, was a parsi and a staunch 
nationalist. These personal factors in his life might have 
had some influence on his political views. In 1927 Jinnah 
was hoping to start a new non-congress non-communal 
independent party He did not succeed. He did, however, try 
to solve the Hindu-Muslim problem by persuading the Muslim 
leaders in March 1927 to give up the communal electorates -
the bone of discord between the two communities - and accpet 
joint electorates on condition that Congress agreed to give 
one-third of the seats in the central legislature to the 
Muslims. Sind was separated from Bombay and reforms were 
introduced in the North-West frontier province. This, 
indeed, was the most generous offer made by the Muslim 
leaders. But it was made at a time when there appeared no 
immediate prospect of a new set of reforms being introduced 
by the British government. 
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Delhi Proposals 
The appointment of the all-British Simon 
Commission to review the working of the 1919 reforms gave an 
opportunity to the Congress and the Muslims to work together 
for the preparation of draft constitution. The ground had 
already been prepared by the Congress in 1926 at Gauhati 
session where it concentrated its attention on the question 
of Hindu-Muslim unity and asked its working committee- to 
"take immediate steps in consulation with Hindu and 
Mussalman leaders to devise measures for the removal of the 
present deplorable differences between Hindus and Mussalmans 
and submit their report to the All India Congress Committee 
not later than the 31 March 1927?^ 
The important step in this direction was taken on 20 
March, when prominent Muslim leaders belonging to various 
Congress, Muslim League and other Muslim groups met in Delhi 
under the presidentship of Jinnah to discuss the question of 
Muslim representation in the legislatures. It was 
unanimously agreed that the Muslims would be prepared to 
give up separate electorates if the following proposals were 
accepted: (i) Sind to be separated from the Bombay 
presidency and constituted into a separate province; (ii) 
reforms to be introduced in North-West frontier province and 
in Baluchistan on the same footing as in any other province 
in India; (iii) in the Punjab and Bengal, the proportion of 
representation to be made in accordance with the population; 
(iv) in the central Legislature Muslim representation not to 
be less than one-third. If all these demands were accepted, 
the Muslim would be prepared to accept Joint electorates in 
all the provinces so constituted and to make to Hindu 
minorities in Bengal, Pubjab and North-West frontier 
provinces the same concessions that the Hindu majorities in 
other provinces were prepared, to make to the Muslims. 
According to the Delhi proposals, the Muslims were 
expected to have majority in the legislatures of five 
provinces of which no fewer than three — Sind, N.W.F.P. and 
Baluchistan contained an overwhelming Muslim majority. The 
end in view was explained by Jinnah in the following words: 
.... Mussalman should be made to feel that they 
are secure and safe-guarded against any act of oppression on 
the part of the majority and they need not feel that during 
the transitional stage towards the fullest development of 
National Government the majority would be in a position to 
oppress and tyrannise the minority as majorities are prone 
to do in other countries. -^  
The working committee of the Congress appreciated 
the preparedness of the Muslim leaders to accept joint 
electorates and passed a lengthy resolution on the Hindu-
10 i 
Muslim question for presentation at the A.I.C.C. session in 
15 May in Bombay. It is significant to note that it 
accepted all the Muslim proposals. The A.I.C.C. unanimously 
adopted the same resolution with minor alterations. The 
principal change suggested was that Sind should not be 
separated on communal grounds but on general grounds 
applicable to all provinces. A change in the wording of the 
resolution removed the objection and it was passed 
unanimously. The Madras session of the Congress held in 
December 1927, gave full assurance to the Muslim that "their 
legitimate interests should be secured .... by the 
reservation of seats in joint electorates on the basis of 
population in every province and in the central legislature 
Sind, N.W.F.P and Baluchistan.^ 
Talking about the resolution passed at the Madras 
session, another Congress leader, Govind Ballabh pant, 
characterized them " as the best and most suitable 
arrangement which carried with it the largest amount of 
support from both the communities." He also said that even 
though reservation of seats was not "Compatible with the 
complete independence", it had been accepted by the Hindus 
at a meeting of the All-India committee with the full 
concurrence of M.R. Jayakar. and Madan Mohan Malaviya, both 
of whom had been the presidents of the Hindu Mahasabha.^ • 
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The All-India Muslim league also, at its session 
in Calcutta on 30 December 1927, accepted the Delhi 
proposals and decided to co-operate with the rest of the 
country in boycotting the statutory commission and in 
framing a constitution for India on lines acceptable to -all 
communities and all parties. This was the result of the 
lead given by Jinnah, Abdur Rahim, Ali Imam, the Raja of 
Mahmudabad and others. But at this Juncture the solidarity 
of the League was broken as one section refused to boycott 
the Simon Commission and also opposed Jinnah and others on 
account of their readiness to give up separate electorates. 
A rival session of the League was convened at Lahore on 31 
December under Mohammad Shafi. An anti-boycott manifesto 
was issued whereby Muslim were warned that •• a resort to the 
sterile policy of boycott will bring nothing but shame and 
sorrow."' 
On the other hand, the Jinnah section contended 
that the proceeding of the League at Lahore were conducted 
in a most arbitrary and unconstitutional manner. A joint 
statement issued under the signatures of Mohammad Alam, 
Hissam-ud-din, Chaudhri Afzal Hug, Mazher Ali Azher, and 
Mohammad Sharif pointed out that barely a dozen attended the 
meeting from provinces other than the Punjab and N.W.F.P. 
iu3 
In accordance with the Madras Congress 
resolution, authorizing the working Committee to confer 
with the other parties to draft a swaraj constitution for 
Indian and to place the same for consideration and approval 
before a conference, the first meeting of the All parties 
conference was held in Delhi on 12 February 1928. The 
Muslim had already been offended by the views expressed by 
the representatives of the Hindu Mahasabha. The latter had 
categorically rejected the principle of reservation of seats 
in favour of any majority community in any province. It was 
also inflexibly opposed to the creation of new Muslim 
provinces as a price for securing joint electorates. Its 
attitude made it clear that it considered seperate 
electorates a lesser evil than the creation of new 
provinces. 
At the All parties conference also, the Mahasabha 
displayed the same intransigence with regard to the Muslim 
demands. Therefore, the only achievement of the meeting was 
that a unanimous resolution was passed on N.W.F.P. and 
Baluchistan placing them on the same footing in respect of 
their form of government and Judicial administration as any 
other province. With regard to Sind, the conference made 
separation subject to two conditions, namely, that the 
province should be financially self-supporting and secondly, 
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the majority of its inhabitants must be in favour of 
separation. It was also pointed out that so long as the 
scheme of Government in the N.W.F.P and Baluchistan was not 
placed on the same footing and Sind was not separated from 
the Bombay presidency, separate electorates for Muslims and 
Sikhs would continue to remain in force. These resolutions 
met with adverse criticism from various quarters. The Hindu 
Mahasabha had practically dissented from them. Sardar 
Mangal Singh, secretary. Central Sikh League, stated on 
behalf of his organization that he could not agree to 
reservation of seats on population basis nor could he accept 
a statutory communal majority. Jinnah, Gaznafar Ali Khan 
and Mohamed Ismail khan made it clear that they would accept 
no deviation from the stand taken by the Congress at the 
time of the Madras session and would accept only those 
propositions which were in accordance with the principles 
embodied in the resolution of the League at its Calcutta 
session with regard to the Constitution laid down for the 
separation of Sind, which were new, they made it clear that 
they clould not accept them until they had consulted the 
Council of the All-India Muslim League which was to meet on 
26 February. 
At the next meeting of the council of the League, 
however, Jinnah and Gazanfar Ali emphatically declared that 
only if the Hindu-Muslim question was settled at the All-
u: I 
parties Conference at its next meeting scheduled to be held 
on 9 March, would the committee apppointed by the Muslim 
League proceed to exmaine other questions and be willing to 
collaborate with the representatives of their organizations. 
On this question the Conference, at its session, 
beginning on 9 March opined, that it was possible to provide 
for the safeguards contemplated by the resolutions of the 
congress and the league, by devising a system of election on 
the principle of proportional representation by a single 
transferable vote or some other similar method. Two sub-
committees were appointed: the first on the investigate the 
whole matter of Communal representation and second to 
enquire into the financial aspect of the separation of Sind. 
The results of the above meetings of the 
Conference were not encouraging. After long hours of 
sittings and elaborate discussions, the advance made was 
insignificant. The initial enthusiasm among the members had 
also waned. Gandhi who did not participate in the meetings 
of the Conference but was interested in its achieving 
Hindu-Muslim unity was grieved at this state of affairs and 
bemoaned the 'miserable show' being put up by those who were 
participating in the Conference against the 'insolence' of 
Lord Birkenhead and his challenge to Indian people to frame 
a constitution. He disapproved of the congress resiling 
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from its stand and exhorted congress leaders that once they 
had •committed• themselves to reservation of seats, they 
must adhere to it until they were able to evolve another 
formula which completely satisfied the Muslims. Shuaib 
Qureshi, the General secretary of the Congress, supported 
Gandhi's views and insisted that congressmen must stand by 
the resolutions of their Madras session. 
But unfortunately Gandhi's views remained 
unheeded. The conference could not make much headway. Some 
congress Muslims like Shafee Daudi and Shah Muhammad Zubair 
suggested to Ansari that the provinces should be encouraged 
to settle their differences on provincial basis. Ansari 
fully subscribed to their views and commended the example of 
Bihar where the Hindus and Muslims had been having a sort of 
Round Table conference for the purpose of arriving at a 
understanding between themselves. As a result he instructed 
various provinces like the Punjab, Bengal, Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka and Sind to follow Bihar as a example. The key to 
the success of the All-parties conference was in the hands 
of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League. The former 
had made it difficult for the conference to hammer out an 
agreed solution by adopting a rigid attitude on the question 
of reservation of seats in a province for the majority 
community. On the other hand, in pursuance of the policy 
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formulated by the council of the muslim League (Ji^hah 
group) in March, its members had refused to take part in the 
subsequent deliberations of the conference. Their main 
grievance was that the All parties conference had modified 
the congress resolutions. 
Other members had also got weary of the conference 
because so far they had failed to secure any substantial 
results. The work of the conference was going to be 
affected by the departure of Jinnah for Europe on 5 May. He 
had been mainly responsible for the Delhi Proposals. The 
Muslims inside the congress grew quite pessimistic regarding 
any definite solution of the outstanding questions being 
brought about in his absence because they felt Jinnah was 
the only man who could deliver the goods on behalf of the 
Muslim League. The All-parties conference dispersed after 
appointing a committee to deal with the communal problem as 
a whole, particularly in relation to the framing of the 
Constitution. 
The committee appointed by the All parties 
conference consisted of members belonging to various 
organizations. Motilal Nehru was appointed its chairman. 
Ali Imam and Shuaib Qureshi represented the (Congress) 
Muslim viewpoint, M.S. Aney and M.R. Jayakar spoke for the 
Mahasabha, Sardar Mangal Singh represented the Sikh League 
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liib 
and Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Liberal viewpoint. But most' of 
the members did not show any deep interest in the work of 
the committee out of ten members appointed on the committee 
Jayakar resigned and Ali Imam did not attend any meeting. 
Those who regularly attended the meeting were Shuaib 
Qureshi, M.S. Aney, Mangal Singh, Tej Bahadur Sapru and 
Motilal Nehru, Being the Chairman of the Committee, Motilal 
Presidently emphasized the supreme necessity of achieving a 
unanimous formula as he was sure that an agreed report would 
be a strong weapon to carry on a compaign in the country 
against the Government. On the question of separation of 
Sind and the grant of equal status to N.W.F.P. "and 
Baluchistan, Motilal was prepared to ignore the oopposition 
of the Mahasabha. But the deadlock occured over the 
reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal. As shuaib 
Qureshi was adamant on this question and Aney was not 
prepared to yield, it led to an impasse and the Nehru 
committee (named after Motilal Nehru) dispersed on 22 June 
without reaching any agreement. 
When an informal conference was held on 7 July 
where Motilal had invited some non-members of both the 
communities, efforts were once again made to resolve the 
communal deadlock. The efforts bore fruit and the Muslims 
were partly satisfied, as their demand for reservation of 
seats in majority provinces was conceded for ten years. The 
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resolution which was signed and passed by both the members 
and non-members ran as follows: 
We are unanimously opposed to the reservation of 
seats in the legislatures either for majorities or 
minorities . . . But if this recommendation is not accepted 
and an agreement can be arrived at only on reservation of 
seats on the population basis, we recommend that such 
reservation be made for majorities or minorities without any 
weightage and with a clear provision that it shall 
automatically cease at the expiry of ten years or earlier by 
the cenent of the parties concerned. 
The Muslims suffered extreme humiliation when the 
first part of the above resolution was modified on the next 
day only the reservation of seats for minorities in Both 
central and provincial legislatures was permitted. Suhaib 
once again argued on behalf of the Muslims that if the 
question of reservation of seats in provincial legislatures 
was to be considered then in the Punjab and Bengal seats 
must be reserved for Muslims in proportion to their 
population. He based his argument on the fact that in these 
two provinces, the Muslims were handicaped by poverty and 
lack of education. On the other hand, the Hindus were well 
organized, wealthy, educated and in control of commerce and 
banking of the Province. This had resulted in the majority 
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being reduced to a minority in the legislatures of the two 
provinces. 
This view was based on hard facts and was also 
shared by other congress Muslim like Shafee Daudi, Tassaduq 
Ahmad Khan Sherwani, etc. The Muslim community in these two 
provinces consisted mainly of agriculturists. The principal 
Muslim castes in the Punjab were Arains, Rajputs and Jats 
most of whom were cultivators. Among the Hindu populations, 
on the other hand, there were largely agriculturists, also 
people belonging to such castes as Banias and Khatris who 
had taken in large numbers to western education and 
dominated not only land and commerce but also the various 
professions. The Muslim were double the number of the 
Hindus among the ordinary cultivators but among the 
landlords and urban middle classes, Hindus were nearly twice 
the number of Muslims. Almost all the big landlords were 
Hindus. The real opposition of the Punjab Hindus was not 
due to any high natuonal consideration, but the fear that 
they might lose their privileged position if the Muslim 
majority in the provincial legislature was guaranteed.^^. 
The Nehru Committee 
The Nehru Committee, was appointed at the All 
parties conference. It met several times at Allahabad and 
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gave its report in August 1928 ^ At the plenary session of 
the All Parties conference at Lucknow in August 1928, the 
Report was adopted unanimously. It was, however, at the All 
parties convention in Calcutta (December 22, 1928 to January 
1, 1929) that objections were raised against the Report by 
the Hindu Mahasabha the Muslim League, and the Sikh League^^ 
The report freely borrowed both from the American, 
as well from the British systems. It also demonstrated the 
maturity of the Indian leaders Many of its recommendations 
were adopted by the constituent assembly of India. Its 
important recommendations mere:-^ -" 
1. Federal Structure 
2. A declaration of rights 
3. A parliamentary system of Government 
4. A bi-cameral Legislature 
5. Adult franchise 
6. Allocation of subjects between the centre and the 
provinces 
7. Redistribution of provincial boundaries on a linguistic 
basis and 
8. An independnt judiciary with a supreme court as its 
head. 
9. The residuary powers vested in the central government. 
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The Nehru conunittee felt that India should have 
the same status within the Empire as other Dominions had. 
Its parliament should have powers to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the country. It would 
have an executive responsible to parliament. The central 
council of ministers should have complete control over all 
the departments including defence and external affairs. 
The Nehru committee stood for provincial autonomy. 
It recommended that the control over the subjects 
transferred to the provinces should be vested in the council 
of ministers, responsible to popularly elected legislatures. 
It opposed any special powers conferred on the governor as 
these powers placed limitations on the provincial ministers 
and also on legislatures. 
However, the Nehru committee rejected the Muslim 
demand for separate electorates and also for reservation of 
seats on comunal basis in the legislatures of the Muslim 
majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab and for weightage of 
seats in the central or provincial legislatures. 
In December 1928, leaders of all parties met in 
the separate sessions of congress and the Muslim league. In 
this session Jinnah attacked the report. As a reaction to 
the Nehru Report the Muslims had withdrawn their offer of 
the previous year and insisted for the continuance of the 
separate electorate. The Nehru report also ignored some 
other demands of Muslims which they had made in return for 
giving up the separate electorate. Jinnah demanded, among 
other things, that the Muslims should have one-third of the 
seats in the future Parliament of India. "He was then 
sincere in his belief that if the Muslim demands were 
conceded they would be reconciled to the Hindus and both the 
communities would march together in future. The communal 
minded Hindu members of Congress, like M.R. Jayakar and M.M. 
Malaviya, opposed Jinnah's amendment. He felt Calcutta 
broken-hearted and with tears in his eyes he said to a 
friend, 'This is the parting of the ways"^^ 
Though, Nehru committee did not use the word 
federal in its draft constitution, the provision which' it 
made for a statutory division of powers between the centre 
and the provinces along with the provision under which the 
supreme court was to be established with power of deciding 
constitutional validity of laws gave to the draft a fully 
federal form. Provincial subjects were listed in a separate 
schedule. It also provided for the residuary powers to be 
vested in the central government and not in the provincial 
governments as demanded by the Muslim league and other 
minority groups. The federation recommended by it was to be 
a centralised one. 
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In the words of Sir Sha^t Ahmad Khan, the Nehru 
Report, "failed to satisfy the minorities; it aroused 
serious apprehensions in the minds of Indian Rulers; the 
European capitalists in India were alarmed, and the 
consolidation of powerful interests which regarded the 
Report as inimical to their interest went on slowly .but 
steadily."^^ 
The committee also made it clear that it had no 
objection to the Indian states entering the federation as 
constituent units. It also laid down that the states shall 
not be given any privileged position in the federation. The 
federal government shall have the same powers in the 
territories of states as in the provinces. It also laid 
down that the units in the federation should have the equal 
status. 
We have to look the causes for the origin .and 
growth of the federal movement in the last stages of British 
rule. These causes are political in character and they 
centre round the emergence of new political forces for which 
there was no precedent in any of the previous periods of our 
history. Among these forces the primary place has to be 
assigned to the rise and growth of nationalism and 
democracy. For the first time in the history there came the 
consciousness among the people that in spite of differences 
il-j 
of race, religion, language and culture they all constituted 
a single nation and as such they had an inherent right to 
rule the country themselves. After 1920 the national 
movement became more aggressive under the leadership of 
Mahatma Gandhi and M.A. Jinnah. As a result the British 
rulers realised that it would be difficult for them to 
resist the demands of nationalism and democracy and that 
sooner or later responsible government would have to be 
conceded. 
Simon Coomission 
According to the Act of 1919 a statutory 
commission was to be appointed ten years after the 
introduction of the reforms to review the political 
situation in India. So the Commission was due in 1929. But 
Lord Lrwin, the Viceroy of India.-^^ announced the 
appointment of a royal commission in 1927. It was to be 
headed by Sir John Simon. The task of the commission was to 
inquire in to the working of the then constitution and to 
find out how successfully or otherwise the dyarchy "was 
working in the provinces. It was also to report on the 
functioning of representative institutions and whether it 
was desirable or not to make further progress towards a 
fully responsible Government. 
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Simon commission consisted of British eleme-nts 
only Lord Birkenhead, the secretary of state, had already 
been warned that a commission consisting of Britishers only 
was unacceptable but he paid no attention to this warning. 
Their reason was that it would be very difficult to give 
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representation to all the political groups in India, 
The exclusion of Indians from the commission, was 
considered as outrageous. Nearly all groups and parties in 
India's boycotted the commission. 
After two years its appointment the commission 
published its report in May 1930. Its recommendation were 
as follows: 
(1) Abolition of Dyarchy and Introduction of Provincial 
Autonomy: On a detailed and careful study of the Indian 
problems, the commission concluded that dyarchy, the 
experiment in self-government, was unworkable because of 
certain inherent weaknesses in the scheme. It, recommended 
the introduction of provincial autonomy.-^^ It also 
recommended that Ministers be made responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order Safeguarders were no doubt 
necessary and for that purpose the Governor should be given 
special powers to takeover the control of entire 
administration of the province in case of breakdown of law. 
Thus the commission recommended the maximum of freedom to 
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the Ministers to run the administration subject to the 
overriding powers of the Governors and the Governor General. 
(2) Special powers of the Governors and the Governor-
General. ^ ° The coininission suggested that the Governors 
should remain in passession of full and simple powers to 
ensure a thoroughly efficient administrative system and to 
safeguard the interests of the minorities. The Governor 
should also be allowed to include one or more non-elected 
experienced officials in his council,^^ but such an official 
Minister should be responsible to the legislative council 
and not the Governor or the Governor-General. 
(3) Irresponsible Government at the centre: The 
commission left the centre untouched. It considered the 
introduction of dyarchy at the centre undesirable. • It 
wanted that the central executive should be completely free 
from the control of the legislature- It considered a strong 
centre to be of utmost importance for the time-being. The 
commission envisaged a federation including the princely 
states after which the issue of a responsible government at 
the centre was to be reconsidered. 
However, they completely ignored the demand for 
responsible government at the centre and made the central 
executive more thoroughly antocratic. Such a scheme was not 
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acceptable to Indians and this aggravated the anger and 
intensified the demand for complete independence. ^ 
(4) Reconstitution of central Legislature: The 
commission suggested the reconstitution of the central 
legislature on federal principle, to include represnetatives 
from all the provinces and princely states an voluntary 
basis to join the proposed federation. It proposed that the 
method of election to both the Houses should be indirect. 
(5) Enlargement of provincial Legislature: The 
commission recommended the enlargement of provincial 
legislatures. The more important provinces should have not 
less than 200 and not more than 250 members. The non-
officials should not be more than ten percent of the total 
membership. The Muslims in provinces where they were in 
minority should be given special and adequate to 
representation. They proposed that the new constitution 
should be made flexible enough to absorb the changes 
whenever necessary. 
Mr. M.A. Jinnah who did not agree with Nehru 
Report put forward his fourteen points in 1929, which 
according to him constituted the minimum demands of the 
Muslims for any political settlement referred to federalism. 
These points were presented before and ratified by the 
Muslim League Council. Its important points were:^"^ 
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(1) The form of any constitution to be drawn for free 
India should be federal with the residuary powers vested in 
the provincial government. 
(2) Every province should enjoy a uniform measure of 
autonomy. 
(3) The minorities should be adequately represented in 
all the Legislative Assemblies and Local Bodies. No attempt 
should be made to reduce their majority in any province to a 
minority or even equality. 
(4) One-third of the total seats in the central 
Assembly should be reserved for the Muslims. 
(5) Representation of all the communities should be on 
the basis of separate electorate. It shopuld be open to any 
group to abandon the system of separate electorate in favour 
of joint electorate. 
(6) Full relegious liberty should be guaranted to 
every individual. 
(7) Adequate share for Muslims should be provided in 
constitution of all services, subject to requirements of 
efficiency. 
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(8) No change in the constitution should be made- by 
central Assembly except with the concurrence concern of the 
units constituting the Indian federation. 
It was quite natural to opose a unitary from of 
democratic government. They opted for federalism because 
although they were a minority in the Country as a whole they 
constituted a majority in Bengal, Punjab, Sind, the North-
West frontier province and Baluchistan Under a federal 
system they would have the satisfaction of enjoying complete 
autonomy in these five provinces without any control being 
exercised over them by Hindus. It was this that prompted 
the Muslim League to pass a resolution in 1924 - the first 
resolution of its Kind- which declared that the existing 
provinces of India shall be united under a common Government 
on a federal basis so that each province shall have full and 
complete provincial autonomy, the function of the central 
Government being confined to such natters as are of general 
land common interest. 
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Chapter - 5 
FEDERAL STRUCTURE UNDER 
THE ACT OF 19 3 5 
The Govt, of India of 1919 Act provided for the 
increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian 
administration, and for the gradual development of self-
governing institutions with a view to the progressive 
realisation of responsible government in india. The 
Britishers were opposed to complete provincial autonomy. 
During the non-cooperation movement, the congress and the 
Muslim League demanded real provincial autonomy, where the 
provinces would be vested with substantive powers. Such a 
demand would have been impossible to concede without a 
federation. They felt that this structure could not be built 
upon the foundations of autocracy and irresponsibility at 
the centre. India's geographical position, the infinite 
diversity of her races and creeds rendered federalism a 
necessity. The Govt, of India Act of 1935 was a new turn 
towards complete federalism as a natural corallary of the 
previous steps taken either unconsciously or unciously. The 
new Act sweept away most of the unitary features of the 
Government of india Act of 1919 and establishes federal 
structure.^ 
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The First Round Table, Conference held in 1930.^ Many 
delegate from India and some eminent political scientists 
were invited to discuss the complexity of Indian problem. 
Most of the delegates were unanimous that federations have 
normally been the expression of a general desire of a number 
of political units, each possessed of sovereignty or at 
least of autonomy, and each willing to surrender to the new 
body which their pact creates and identical range of powers 
and jurisdiction, to be exercised by it on their behalf to 
the same extent for each one of them individually and the 
federation as a whole. 
There was a hurdle in the way of federalism and it was 
that the provinces had no original or independent status or 
authority to surrender. Their powers were derivative. It was 
the Secretary of state for India who was vested with 
unlimited authority regarding governance of India. 
The Indian states-stood on an entirely different 
footing. The status were free to enter the federation or 
not. It seemed that the states were detemnined to undermine 
the federal idea. They wanted to preserve their autonomy 
over a substantial number of important subjects. Hence the 
range of federal authority over federated states was to be 
reduced. Indian federation was unique in the variety and 
inequality of federal subjects which the two classes of 
units were to be called upon to bear, and in the complicated 
arrangements for the enforcement of federal laws in the two 
classes. 
Difficulties of Indian Federation 
A federal Government is infinitely more complicated 
than a Unitary Governmen't, and in the case of an All-India 
Federation the complications were to be intensified by the 
fact that the units showed an extraordinary diversity. These 
complications had their impact upon the application of 
almost every provision of the Act."* Take, for instance, the 
provisions relating to the establishment of the federation. 
The princess being voluntary agents could not be forced to 
accede. They determined the character of the federal 
executive and the federal legislature, as each class of 
units demanded effective representation both in the 
Government and in the federal legislature. Again, they had 
influenced the relations between the two houses of the 
legislature. These problems complicated the federal plan. 
Section 5 summarises the main points of an agreement among 
different parties relating to the inauguration of 
federation. An important body of opinion suggested, in 1931, 
the passing of a short amending Bill establishing complete 
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provincial autonomy in British India. The advocates of this 
policy were anxious for giving immediately autonomy to the 
provinces and argued that it was better to go ahead with 
complete self-government in the provinces so that all units 
of federation may be fully prepared for the important part 
which they would play in the federal centre. This, of 
course, did not mean that the federal plan would become a 
remote, possibility, nor did it imply any departure on the 
part of any delegate or section from the broad lines of the 
federal scheme. They merely wished to expedite the work of 
the Conference by going ahead with an important part of the 
Reforms without further delay. These proposals could not be 
carried out as it was feared that if autonomous provinces 
were started without a federal link at the centre, 
centrifugal forces would play their part, and the plan of 
All-India federation might be ruined. The federation, if 
started under such conditions, would have become much 
weaker, as all the provinces would have combined on one 
common objective, viz. to extract from such a weak centre a 
maximum amount of financial, legislative and administrative 
concessions. Such a centre would have been unstable and 
incompetent. 
Clause 6(ii) of the Bill as originally framed provided 
that "A state shall be deemed to have acceded to the 
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federation if His Majesty has signified his acceptance of a 
delcaration made by the Ruler thereof, whereby the Ruler for 
himself, his heirs and successor. 
(a) delcares that he accepts this Act as applicable to his 
state and to his subjects, with the intents that His Majesty 
the King, the Governor-General of India, the federal 
legislature, the federal court, and any other federal 
authority established for the purposes of the federation 
shall exercise in relation to his state and to his subjects 
such functions as may be vested in them by or under this 
Act. 
(b) Specifies which of the matters mentioned in the federal 
list he accepts as matters with respect to which the federal 
legislature may make laws for his state and his subjects and 
specifies any condition to which his acceptance of any such 
matter is to be deemed to be subject; and 
(c) Assumes the obligation of ensuring that due effect" is 
given to this Act within his State."^ 
The states according to court had a very strong case 
and occupied a strategic position in their negotiations with 
British, on the one hand, and the Crown on the other. 
Another difficulty would be that neither the British 
Parliament nor the British indian provinces could know what 
type of federation going to be formed. There would be no 
uniformily of administration or legislation. There would 
consequently be not one constitution for India but fifty 
different constitutions, each containing an infinite variety 
of arrangements and each capable of an infinite amount of 
misconstruction. The states had to retain their power over 
subjects for which they had not federated. There would have 
been two parallel administrations in every federated state -
- with federal officials and state officials each putting a 
different direction. 
Foundations of Federation 
It made the basic assumption that the constitution will 
recognise the principle to certain special provisions and 
the more responsibility for the federal Government of India. 
The constitution Act should provide that the Executive power 
and authority shall vest in the Crown or in the Governor-
General and that there shall be a Council of Ministers 
appointed by the Governor-General and holding office at his 
pleasure. The Governor-General's Instrument of Instructionss 
will then direct him to appoint as his Ministers those who 
command the confidence of the legislature. Therefore, it was 
agreed by almost every delegate. 
Governing Principles underlying the New Act 
These were the governing principles are embodied in the 
Act of 1935. It laid down that there should be a Council of 
Ministers of not more than members ten to aid and advise the 
Governor-General in the exercise of his function except 
those he was required to exercise under instrument of 
Instructions to special responsibilities. 
Section 12 specifies the Governor-General's special 
responsibilities.^ 
(a) The prevention of any grave menace to the peace or 
tranquillity of India; 
(b) The safeguarding of the financial stability and 
credit of the federal Government; 
(c) The safeguarding of the legitimate interests of 
minorities; 
(d) The securing that the due discharge of his 
functions with matters with respect to which he is by or 
under this Act required to act in this direction, or to 
exercise his individual judgement, is not prejudicial or 
impeded by any course of action taken with repsect to any 
other matter. 
The special responsibilities were duties imposed on the 
Governors and Governor-General which may emerge at any time 
in any field, it is not intended to be a field administered 
by separate departments with separate staff.^ 
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The Instruments of Instruction indicated the manner in 
which powers specified in the Act were to be exercised, and 
direct the Governor-General and Governor to develop 
conventions which was aimed at removing possibility of 
friction between the two halves of the Government. Lord 
Reading emphasised the point that the Instrument of 
Instruction could not add anything to an Act of Parliament. 
Instruments of Instructions have played a notable part in 
the history of British Dominions in the development of 
responsible government and building up of conventions and 
usage which have bridged the gulf between strict legal 
theory and constitutional usage. Instruments of Instructions 
to Governor develop basic principles which, though not 
embodied in the Act, are to be kept in mind in the actual 
conduct of provincial administration. 
By the Instrument of Instruction, the Governor-General 
was required to safeguard the legitimate rights of^ (1) 
minorities and securing them due proportion in the services; 
(2) the legitimate rights of members of public service; (3) 
with the execution of provisions relating to discrimination 
and (4) safeguarding the interests of Indian states. 
The Instrument of Instructions required the Governor-
General to deals with most of the subjects covered by 
instructions to the Governor, though it was necessarily 
concerned with a wider field. It reproduces the 
recommendations of the federal structure committee regarding 
the financial stability of the federation, and the proposals 
of the Defence Sub-Committee, that the defence of India must 
be the concern of Indian people. The Instructions directed 
him to avoid action which would affect the competence of his 
Government and of the federal legislature to develop their 
own economic or fiscal policy or restrict their freedom to 
negetiate trade agreements, whether with the United Kingdom 
or with other countries. The conditions regarding the 
consultation of the finance Minister by other departments 
were most stringent in this Instrument, for besides the 
provision quoted already, the following was added, 
"No reappropriation within a grant shall be made by a 
Minister otherwise than after consultation with the finance 
ministers: and in any case in which the finance Minister is 
not consulted in any such proposal the matter shall be 
brought for decision before the Council of Ministers"^° . 
Joint Consultation in Federal Government 
The Governor-General shall by all possible means 
encourage consultation with a view to common action between 
the federation, provinces and federated states. The 
Governor-General was required not give his previous sanction 
to the imposition of surcharge on Income tax, until he was 
satisfied himself that all possible economies have been 
affected by the federation. Regarding his assent to any-
provincial law which fell within the concurrent list, the 
Governor-General should have due regard to the importance of 
preserving substantially the those broad principles through 
which uniformity of legislation had been established. 
This analysis of the Instruments of Instruction will 
show at a glance the important character of these documents. 
The Instrument of Instruction to the Governor-General 
embodied the principles which had proved successful in the 
working of dyarchy. The Instrument of Instructions directed 
the Governor-General to keep these principles in view when 
setting machinery in motion. Collective responsibility of 
the two sides of the Government is essential to the smooth 
running of the machinery and a wise Viceroy had to act on as 
Lord Elgin did in Canada in the nineteenth century. The 
Instrument gave him sufficiently wide power to justify his 
action as a constitutional head, and to carry on his work on 
the lines on which Governments are now carried on in Canada 
or Australia. But there were some very important differences 
in the structure of these Dominions and Indian Governments. 
The Act of 1935 provided the provision that the 
Governor will be "aided and advised", and not "guided" by 
the Council of Ministers in the exercise of his functions 
except in so far as he is by the Act required to act in his 
discretion. The Act of 1919 created a precedent, and the 
omission of the word "guided" is manifestation of a reality. 
The Act provided that the draft Instruments of 
Instruction had to be approved by the two Houses of 
Parliament. Parliament was then asked to undertake a 
responsibility which it had not exercised before and give 
its consent to any Instrument that might be prepared by the 
Executive. It could not be issued until it was approved by 
both the houses of Parliament. 
Provincial Administration 
The changes in the provincial sphere under the Govt, of 
India Act of 1935, were brought into force from April 1, 
1937. 
As regards the structure of the provincial government, 
the most important features was that the provinces, for the 
first time, were vested, with a separate constitutional 
identity by the devolution of autonomy. 
The Govt. of India Act of 1935 removed the 
administration of the provinces from the immediate control 
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of His Majesty's Government. It made the provinces the 
centres of the development of federal plan. •'• 
The provinces were as follows Presidencies of (I) 
Bengal, (II) Madras, and (III) Bombay, and the provinces 
known as (IV) the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, (V) the 
Punjab, (VI) Bihar, (VII) Orissa (VIII) the central 
provinces, (IX) Assam, (X) The North-West Frontier Provinces 
and (XI) Sind. 
The Government of India Act of 1935 established full 
provincial autonomy, and the distinction between Reserved 
and Transferred subjects was done away with. All the 
subjects were then placed in the charge of Ministers, who 
was to be responsible to the legislature for their working. 
The provincial government was to be run by the cabinet, with 
a Chief Minister and such other Ministers as may be 
appointed as on his recommendation.-^^ 
Provincial list-^  comprised of 54 items including 
Public order; Police; Provincial Public Service Commission; 
Land acquisition; Local Government; Public Health and 
sanitation; Education; Agriculture; Forests; Land revenue 
etc. 
Instead of subjects being reserved, special powers were 
given to the Governors against violence intended to 
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overthrow the government. The powers given to the Governors 
were powers which were over and above their special 
responsibilities for the prevention of any grave menace to 
peace and tranquillity.-^"^ The powers were conferred, 
(according to the Report of the Joint Committee) to ensure 
that the measures taken to curb terrorism and other 
activities of revolutionaries were not to be less effective. 
The Government of India Act of 1935^^ spelt out the 
special responsibilities of the Governors as follows: 
(1) the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or 
tranquillity of the province or any part thereof; 
(2) the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of 
minorities; 
(3) the securing to persons, who were members of the public 
services, of any rights provided or preserved for them by or 
under the Government of India Act of 1935 and the 
safeguarding of their legitimate interests; 
(4) the securing in the sphere executive action of the 
purposes which the provisions of the Government of India Act 
of 1935, relating to discrimination, detrimental to British 
subjects or Business interests, were designed to secure in 
relation to legislation; 
(5) the securing of the peace and good government of the 
areas which by or under the provisions of the Act were 
declared to be partially excluded areas; 
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(6) the protection of the rights of any Indian State and 
the rights and dignity of the Ruler thereof; and 
(7) the securing of the execution of orders or directions 
lawfully issued to him under part VI of the Government of 
India Act of 1935 (dealing with the administrative relations 
between the federation and the provinces) by the Governor-
General in his discretion. 
In each Governor's province there was a Legislative 
council. The councils could be classified into two 
categories: In four provinces, viz., Madras, Bombay, U.P. 
and Assam, all the elective seats were filled by special 
constituencies for the purpose. The councils in Bengal and 
Bihar had about half the members elected by proportional 
representation with the single transferable vote. Thus, in 
an indirect manner the general electors exercised influence 
over the upper chambers also. The members of the council 
were returned from the following special constituencies: (i) 
General, (ii) Mohammedan, (iii) European, and (IV) Indian 
Christians. Some of the seats in each province were filled 
by nomination by the Governor. Depressed class memsbers and 
women were nominated by the Governor to the upper house. 
Every legislative councils was a permanent body and 
could not be dissolved. On-third of the members had to 
retire every third year. 
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In each Governor's province there was a provincial 
legislature consisting of the Governor, and a legislative 
assembly. There was no change of principles in the 
allocation of seats in legislative assemblies and councils. 
Separate electorates and "weightage' were retained. The size 
of legislative assemblies varied from 250 in Bengal to 50 in 
North-West Province. The legislative assemblies in the 
provinces consisted of members returned by as many as 
eighteen type of electorate: (i) the so-called , general 
constituencies included of Hindus; scheduled castes; and 
also Muslims (iv) the European; (v) the Anglo-Indian (vi) 
the Indian Christain; (vii) the Sikh (in the Punjab); (viii) 
the women (general) ; (ix) the women (SiJch) ; (x) the women 
(Muslim); (xi) the women (Anglo-Indian); (xii) the women 
(Indian Christian); (xiii) Commerce, and Industrial, mainly 
British, e.g.. Chamber of Commerce planters Association, 
Mining Associations, etc., (xiv) Indian Commerce and 
Industry; (xv) the Landlords; (xvi) Labour; (xvii) 
Universities; (xviii) Backward Areas and Tribes powers was 
given to His Majesty-in-Council to make provision from time 
to time, with respect to franchise and elections, so far as 
they were not specified in the Government of India Act, 
1935. For that purpose. Delimitation of Constituencies 
Committee, with Sir Laurie Hammond, as Chairman, and Sir M. 
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Venkata Subba Rao and Justice Din Mohammad as members, was 
constituted. The Committee gave its Report on 23 January, 
1936. (Provincial Schemes, were prepared earlier by 
provincial committees consisting were placed before this 
committee. These schemes were modified on the basis of 
Memoranda and evidence before it). The recommendation of the 
committee were subsequently embodied in two orders-in-
council, dated April 30, 1936, relating respectively to 
provincial assemblies and provincial councils. 
The vality of any proceedings in a provincial 
legislature could not be called in question on the ground of 
any irregularity.-^ 
The Government of India Act also provided that no 
officer or other member of the legislature in whom powers 
were vested for regulating procedure or the conduct of any 
business, or maintaining order, in the house shall be 
subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the 
exercise by him of those powers. 
Further the Government of India Act, 1935, laid down 
that in future, therefore, demand for a writ of mandamus" or 
writ of certiorari on the president, for instance, in a high 
court would not affect the conduct of business of a 
legislature. 
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Paragraph XVIII of the Instrument of Instructions to 
the Governors laid down that the Governor shall not give 'his 
assent, but, shall reserve for the consideration of our 
Governor-General, any Bill of the classes herein specified, 
that is to say: (1) any Bill, the provisions of which would 
repeal or be repugnant to the provisions any Act of 
Parliament extending to British India, (ii) any Bill which 
in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the 
powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which 
that court is by the said Act designed to fill; 
(iii) any Bill which would alter the character of the 
permanent settlement; and 
(iv) any Bill regarding which he feels doubt whether- it 
does, or does not, offend against the purposes of the 
provisions with respect to discrimination. 
Even when the Government of India Act of 1935 received 
the assent of the Governor or the Governor-General, it might 
be disallowed by His Majesty within twelve months from the 
date of such assent; and when any Act was so disallowed, the 
Governor was to make the fact known by public notification. 
Special provisions were made conferring a reserve of 
legislature power to the federal legislature. It was 
provided that if the Governor-General, in his discretion, 
delcared by proclamation that a grave emergency existed 
whereby the security of India was threatened, whether by war 
or internal disturbance, the federal legislature was 
empowered to make laws for a province or any part thereof 
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the 
provincial legislature list. No bill or amendment for such 
purpose, however, was to be introduced or moved without the 
previous sanction of the Governor-General in his discretion, 
and the Governor-General was not to give his sanction unless 
it appeared to him that the proposed legislation was not in 
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contravention to the emergency. 
If any provision of a provincial law was repugnant to 
any provision of a federal law which the federal legislature 
had power to make under this section, the federal law, 
whether passed before or after the provincial law, was to 
prevail. 
A Proclamation of Emergency 
It was laid down that a proclamation of emergency 
(i) might be revoked by a subsequent proclamation; 
(ii) was to be communicated forthwith to the Secretary of 
state for India, and was to be laid by him before each house 
of parliament; and 
(iii) was to cease to operate at the expiration of o^ 
six months, unless before the expiration of that period if 
it was approved of by resolutions of both houses of 
parliament. 
All special lawa, made by the federal Legislature by 
virtue of a Proclaimation of Emergency were cease to have 
effect on the expiration of a period of six month after the 
proclaimation had ceased to operate, except with respect to 
things done or omitted to be done before the expiration that 
period. 
There were two kinds of Ordinances : (i) an ordinance 
assumed the existence of an emergency and this could arise 
in connection with any branch of the administration, whether 
the Governor's special responsibilities were involved or 
not; and 
(ii) the White paper also proposed that the Governor shall 
have to make ordinances for the good government of the 
province at any time when the legislature was not in 
session, if his Ministers were satisfied that an emergency 
existed which rendered such a course of action necessary. 
With respect to certain subjects, regarding which the 
Governor was required to act in his discretion, or to 
exercise his individual judgement, he could, however, 
promulgate ordidnances at any time. Such an ordinance could 
continue in operation for a period met exceeding six months, 
as might be specified therein and could be extneded for a 
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further period of six months. But every such ordinance: 
(i) was to be subject to the provision of the Act relating 
to the power of His Majesty to disallow any Act, as if it 
were an Act of provincial legislature; 
(ii) might be withdrawn at any time by the Governor; and 
(iii) if it was an ordinance, extending a previous ordinance 
for a further period, was to be communicated forthwith 
through the Governor-General to the Secretary of State for 
India, and was to be laid by him before each House of 
Parliament.-^^ 
The functions of the Governor under this section to be 
exercise by him in his discretion, but he was not to 
exercise any of his powers thereunder, except with the 
concurrence of the Governor-General in his discretion. But, 
if it appeared to the Governor that it was impracticable to 
obtain in time the concurrence of the Governor-General, he 
might promulgate an ordinance without the concurrence of the 
Governor-General, but in that case, the Governor-General, 
could exercise his discretion and, the ordinance could be 
withdrawn. 
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Chapter - 6 
PRELUDE TO INDIAN 
FEDERALISM 
The Government of India Act of 1935 proposed the 
formation of a centralised federation. It contained all 
three features. The subjects were clearly divided between 
the centre and the units. The constitution was also 
considered supreme and rigid. There was provision for the 
establishment of a federai court to interpret the 
constitution. But still it was far from being an ideal or 
complete federation. The Act was disappointing both congress 
and league because it did not hold out assurance about 
granting Dominion status. Every political party of India 
condemned it for one reason or another. Mr. M.A. Jinnah, the 
leader of the Muslim League, described it as thoroughly 
rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable. 
Jawaharlal Nehru condemned it as a new ''char^^^ of 
salavery. 
However, the federal part of the Government of India 
Act of 1935 could not be implemented for the hostile 
attitude of all the political parties. Only the part 
relating to the provinces came in operation in 1937. The 
elections were held for legislature in the provinces in 
February, 1937. And in July, 1937, the congress formed 
ministries in six provinces.^ In N.W.F.P. and Assam it 
agreed to form coalition ministries with the co-operation of 
the League. In U.P. at the time of elections, the relations 
between the League and Congress were so cordial that they 
hoped to work together after the elections. During his tours 
even Nehru had sometimes supported the League Candidates. 
The Jamat-ul-ulma leaders also supported them. After .the 
elections, however, the anti-congress group in the League 
became dominant. Towards the end of June Khaliquzzaman, the 
U.P. Muslim League leader asked the congress to form League-
Congress Coalition Ministries. The idea conveyed by him to 
Nehru was that he was working for a close co-operation with 
the congress. Nehru objected to this and said that they had 
joined hands with British imperialism Khaliquzzaman replied 
that he had associated himself with the Muslim League with a 
view to rooting out the influence of the reactionary group 
in the League. At the same time he complained against the 
congress programme of mass contact and felt that it had 
contributed towards stiffening of the attitude of 
reactionaries. In another meeting with Maulana Azad in 
Lucknow, Khaliquzzaman expressed his readiness to give Nehru 
a 'blank cheque if the latter he was prepared to include 
himself and Nawab Ismail Khan in the ministry. The congress 
leaders including Azad got attracted by the idea of the 
entire Muslim group being absorbed in the congress. The 
congress could not resist the temptation as Nehru's wrote to 
Rajendra prasad: 
"....the alternative was worth having if it could be 
secured. This was the winding up of the Muslim League 
croup in the Up and its absorption in the Congress. 
Tiiis would have a great effect not only in the U.P. but 
all over India and outside. This would mean a free 
field for our work without communal troubles. This 
would knock over the British Government which relied so 
much on these troubles." 
Maulana Azad contends that the effort to have a 
congress-league coalition failed because of Nehru's 
insistence that the League should not be given more than one 
seat in the Ministry. This seems to be an 
oversimplification. No doubt, Nehru feared reaction among 
the Congress Muslims in particular who were going to be 
taken into office. At last it was decided to offer 
'stringent conditions' to the Muslim League group to take 
two of their leaders in the Ministry. The conditions were 
that group including its U.P. parliamentary Board was 
dissolved. All the Muslim League members of legislative 
assembly were to become full member of the congress and to 
abide by its discipline and in the forthcoming election the 
League was asked not to put up its candidates. Khaliquzzanan 
neither agreed to the winding up of the League's 
parliamentary Board, nor contesting at the by-elections. 
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Something similar to U.P. had happened in Bombay also. 
The information given by K.M. Munshi reveals that Jinnah had 
wanted to co-operate with the congress on condition that he 
should nominate two persons for cabinet. The congress 
leadership wanted Jinnah in return that his nominees should 
accept the congress discipline and also accept the principle 
of joint responsibility. This made clear to him that the 
congress was not prepared to associate the Muslim League in 
the administration of the country unless it was merged in 
the Congress. Khaliquzzaman not to pursue his efforts to 
conciliate the congress. The Raja of Mahmudabad expressed 
his regret at the congress attitude. 
In his presidential address, Jinnah spoke very bitterly 
against the cov'ingress because of its "demand for 
unconditional surrender and attempts to liquidate the 
League" and exhorted the Muslims to organise themselves and 
be united.^ 
Apart from Jinnah, other Muslims leaders like Syed 
Mahmud and Maulana Azad were also growing critical of the 
congress attitude towards Muslims. The Muslim League in its 
bitterness, tried its best to be critical by publicising the 
alleged communal behaviour of the congress ministries. Most 
of the complaints were about forcing Muslim school children 
to sing Bande Matram; the Hindu-Urdu controver'sy; 
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unfortunate incidents outside mosques and congress efforts 
to prevent Muslim representatives from being elected to 
local bodies.^ Pirpur and Sharif committees were also 
appointed to make an enquiry into these grievances in 
various congress ruled provinces of U.P. and Bihar. The 
reports presented by the committees readily confirmed these 
charges.® 
On the 11th of September, 1939, in an address to a 
joint session of both houses of the central legislature, the 
Governor-General reiterated "I will add only one word 
more in regard to our federal preparations. Those 
preparations, as you are aware, are well advanced and great 
labour has been lavished on them in the last three years. 
Federation remains as before the objective of His Majesty's 
Government; but you will understand, gentlemen, without any 
elaborate exposition on my part, the compulsion of the 
present international situation and the fact that, given the 
necessity for concentrating on the emergency that confronts 
us, we have no choice but to hold in suspense the work in 
connection with preparations for federation as our goal."^ 
Thus the federal scheme embodied in the Government of India 
Act of 1935 was held in suspense. 
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In 1939 Nehru wrote to Rajendra Prasad: 
....There is no doubt that we have been unable to check 
the growth of communalism and anti-congress feeling 
among the Muslim masses.... one of the most remarkable 
signs of the times is the forment amongst the Muslims 
in India both the intelligentsia and the masses.-^  
Rajendra prasad had also written to Nehru in the same 
vein: 
"....for the last two or three years I have been 
feeling very much the want of some provisions which 
could ensure adequate representation of the Muslims' in 
the Congress Committees. ^-^  
This awakening of the congress leaders was too late. 
The cumulative impact of the Muslim fears and League's 
propaganda was the growth of opposition in the Muslim League 
to the idea of 1935 type of All-India Federation. By the end 
of the year 1938, the Muslim League determined not to let 
any community he dominated by the other in a future federal 
set-up. They felt that the congress demand for complete 
independence and a federal system was against the Muslim 
interest. 
Sikandar Hayat Khan in an interview with Henry Craik, 
the Governor of Punjab, gave reasons for the Muslim 
opposition to the idea of federation. He told that the 
tendency would be for the "party in the power at the centre 
to intervene in all provincial matters."^^ Although 
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recruitment to the armed forces would be a reserved subje'ct, 
he felt that, the congress ministry would influence it. He 
envisaged a situation where the congress would work steadily 
against the existing large share of the Punjab. He concluded 
by saying that the Government would commit a mistake by 
including federation in the near future. He presented an 
alternative plan of a federation of zones instead of a 
federation of provinces. 
It will be appropriate to point out that he was mainly 
concerned to have a centre in which both the legislature and 
the executive would equally represented the different 
federating units, i.e. each federal unit having an equal 
number of representatives both in the legislature and the 
executive. For this purposes India had to be divided into 
seven units or zones. It should be noted that this 
alternative scheme of federation was referred to by Sir 
Sikander in 1937 at the Lucknow session of the League. 
Jinnah was no less dissatisfied with the type of 
federation envisaged by the congress and the British. It was 
evident that he would seek from the Viceroy redress of his 
grievances. Already in a meeting with Brabourne he alongwith 
Sikander Hayat Khan had expressed his concern that the 
government and the congress were aiming for a federation 
centralised type. In the same meeting he had assured that 
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the Muslims would support the government throughout war if 
their demand was accepted. Jinnah suggested that they keep 
the centre as it was then, that they would befriend by 
protecting their interests the congress ruled provinces, and 
in exchange the Muslims would protect them at the centre.,-" 
The Viceroy was also anxious to support the League as 
he found in it a real check against the congress. That he 
also respected Jinnah's sentiments is evident from his 
statement that "it would be greatest mistake in any way to 
discount the importance of expression of opinion 
particularly from a man of the standing of Jinnah and we 
must give full weight to them Muslims."^^ 
Congress leadership failed to work out a solution 
with the Muslim League in the new context of provincial 
autonomy and federation had led the better to search for a 
new formula solution. 
The working committee of the congress rejected the 
August offer and authorised Gandhiji to start the civil 
disobedience movement in 1940. League also rejected the 
August offer. Nearly 30,000 congress men courted 
imprisonment in 1941. 
The war had now moved to India's door step. Churchill 
and Roosevelt turned their attention to India. The congress 
prisoners were released soon after the Pearl Harbor 
disaster. The fall of Rangoon promoped Churchill to 
despatch to India in March 1942 a cabinet Minister, Sir 
Stafford Cripps. 
The Cripps Mission 
Owing to the imminence of the Japanes invasion of 
India, the British war cabinet realised the importance' of 
the whole hearted co-opration of the Indian people and sent 
Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal, a member of the war 
cabinet, to India with its proposal. The object of Sir 
Stafford's visit was to ascertain whether the proposals of 
the war cabinet would be generally acceptable to Indian 
opinions. The India National Congress, the Muslim League, 
the chamber of princes and the Hindu Mahasabha were asked to 
nominate their own representatives to hold discussions with 
him, and representatives of the sikhs, the Liberal Party and 
the Scheduled Castes also were invited to meet him. Sir 
Stafford Cripps also desired to see other representative 
people including the provicial Chief Minister^^. 
Cripps reached New Delhi on 23rd March^^ and the 
proposals were published on 3oth March 1942 . During the 
interval, he interviewed Indian leaders. The draft 
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declaration, which he issued on behalf of the British 
Government, was as follows:-
"His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties 
expressed in this country and India as to the fulfilment of 
the promises made in regard to the future of India, have 
decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps 
which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible 
realisation of self-government in India. The object is the 
creation of new Indian Union which shall constitute a 
Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other 
Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to 
them in every respect in no way subordinate in any aspect of 
its domestic and external affairs. 
"His Majesty's Government, therfore, make the following 
declaration: 
"(a) Immidiately upon the cessation of hostilities, 
steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner 
described here after, an elected body charged with the task 
of framing a new Constitution for India. 
"(b) Provision shall be made, as ser out below, for 
participation of the Indian States in the constitution 
making body. 
"(c) His Majesty's Government undertaken to accept and 
implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only 
to:-
"(i) The light of any province of British India that is 
not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its 
present constitutional position, provision being made for 
its subsequent accession if it so decides. 
"With such non-acceding province, should they so 
desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree 
upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as 
Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogues to 
that here laid down. 
"(ii) the signing of a treaty which shall be 
negotiated between His Majasty's Government and the 
constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all 
necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of 
responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make 
provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His 
Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and 
relegious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on 
the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its 
relationship to the other Member States of the British 
Commonwealth. 
Whether or not an Indian state elects to adhere to the 
constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision 
of its treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required 
in the new situation. 
"(d) The constitution making-body shall be composed as 
follwos, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the 
principal communities agree upon some other form before the 
end of hostilities:-
"Immidiately upon the result being known of the 
provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of 
hostilities, the entire membership of the lower houses of 
the provincial legislatures shall, as a single electoral 
college, proceed to the election of the constitution making-
body by the system of proportional representation. This new 
body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the 
electoral college. 
"Indian states shall be invited to appoint 
representatives in the same proportion to their total 
population as in the case of representatives of British 
India as a whole, and with the same power as British Indian 
members. 
"(e) During the critical period which now faces India 
and untill the new constitution can be framed His Majesty's 
Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and 
retain control and direction of the defence of India as part 
of their world was effort, but task of organising to the 
full the military, moral and material resources of India 
must be the responsibility of the Government of India with 
the co-opration of the people of India. His Majesty's 
Government desire and invite the immediate and effective 
participation of the leaders of the principal sections of 
the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the 
commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will, be 
enabled to give their active and constructive help in the 
discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the 
future freedom of India".-^ ^ 
According to the proposal, therefore, India would after 
the war, become a Dominion with the full right to secede 
from the British commonwealth and with the right to enter 
independently into treaties with any other nation in the 
world. The representative of the provinces were to be 
elected by the lower houses of provincial legislatures 
elected after the cessation of hotilities. The constitution 
making body would have as its object the framing of a single 
constitution for the whole of India. The provinces were to 
come together to frame a common constitution. But, if they 
found that they could not overcome their differences and 
some provinces were still not satisfied with the 
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constitution, then such provinces could remain out with 
complete self-government. In a letter to Maulana Azad 
(dated April 2, 1942) Sir Stafford Cripps said that a 
province should reach its decision by a vote in the 
legislative Assembly on a resolution that the provinces 
should joined the Indian Union and that, if the majority for 
accession was less than 60%, the minority would have the 
right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population^^ 
which would then determine the matter by a simple majority. 
It seems that the resolution might be negatived effectively 
(i.e., province might decide not to join the Indian Union) 
by a simple majority in the Legislative Assembly. 
A treaty was to be concluded between the British 
Government and the constitution-making body providing for 
the transfer of power. Such a treaty would make a provision 
for the protection of racial and religious minorities. 
The main features of the draft declaration so far as 
future was concerned were, therefore, provision for 
Dominion Status with the right of secession, to the 
constituent units, the constitution to be framed by a 
constituent Assembly, for a possible partition of the 
country and for a treaty providing for the transfer of power 
and safeguards for minorities. 
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The hint of a possible partition of the country had the 
impact on the integrity in India. While Mr. Jinnah 
stiffened his attitude the congress could not decide. Sir 
Stafford Cripps proposal to transfer all the departments 
except Defence to Indians. The British view-point was that, 
in a war in Europe the ministry of defence could not be 
transferred to indians. The British government was fully 
responsible for the defence of India. Therefore the defence 
must be dealt with as part of the world war effort in which 
it was then engaged. The direction of defence must rest in 
the hands of the commander-in-chief in India under the war 
cabinet and the highest staff officers.^° 
The congress working commitee considered the proposal 
from 29th March to 10th April, 1942 and rejected it. 
Negotiations continued till 10th April, when they finally 
broke down. The resolution was published on 11th April. 
The congress working commitee appreciated the fact that 
the principle of self-determination for the people of India 
was recognized in the proposal, related to an uncertain 
future - upon the close of war. But the proposal had also 
the germs of partition of India for, under the plan, it was 
entirely voluntary on the part of the provinces and the 
states to join the union of India. The novel principle of 
non-accession for a province was a great blow to the concept 
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of Indian unity. This was likely to create trouble in the 
provinces, and that might lead to further complications in 
the way of the Indian states joining the Indian union. 
The congress working committee observed : "It has been 
made clear that the defence of India will in any event 
remained under British control. At any time defence is a 
vital subject ; during war time it is all important and 
covers almost every sphere of life and administration. To 
take away defence from the sphere of responsibility at this 
stage is to reduce that responsiblity to a force and 
nullity, and to make it perfectly clear that India is not 
going to function as a free and independent government 
during the pendency of the war. -^  
Moreover, after the first interview of Maulana Azad, 
the then president of congress, with Sir Stafford Cripps', 
the congress leadership was of the view that the new central 
government would function as a cabinet, and therefore, the 
Governor General's relation with his Executive Council would 
be the same as that of the British Monarch with his 
cabinet.^^ 
In regard to the conduct of war, the Commander-in-Chief 
would have freedom to act as the war ministry. The congress 
expressed its readiness to take responsibility, if a real 
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national government was installed. By national government, 
the congress now meant a cabinet government. Before the 
final failure of the Mission, a lot of negotiations were 
held between the congress representatives and Sir Staffers 
Cripps' about the defence portfolio. 
The congress working committee asked for a list of the 
functions of both the defence member and the war member for 
clarification of the functions of the two. No such list were 
made available. At last, the congress working committee 
decide on 10th April that it to reject the proposal.^-^ The 
other parties also rejected the proposal for other reasons. 
The Sikhs were opposed to the proposals because these 
provided for seperation of provinces. They demanded an 
autonomous unit for the population of any area opposed to 
seperation. 
To the Muslim League, the idea of single union, the 
proposed creation of the constitution-making body, the 
procedure for ascertaining the will of the province to 
accession were objectionable. 
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Dr.M.R.Jayakar presented a 
memorandum to Cripps' on 4th April 1942. They strorigly 
pressed for inclusion of an Indian defence member in the 
Governor General's Executive Council and asked that the 
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majority required for a decision by a provincial Legislative 
assembly for or against accession should be 65% of the 
Indian members present at the time of voting. The memorandum 
also opposed plebiscite. In addition, it pressed for the 
revival of popular government in the provinces.^'* 
On 11th April 1942, Sir Stfford Cripps' announced at a 
press conference the withdrawal of the draft proposal.^^ 
The Wavell Plan, 1945, Amery, Secretary of State for 
India, made a statement on 14th of June, 1945, in the House 
of Commons. His statement represent the plan known in India 
as the Wavell Plan, after the name of then Governor-General 
and Viceroy of India. Lord Wavell had left for London on 
March 21, 1945, for urgent consultations with Amery and 
Churchill and had returned to India on June 4.^^ 
The main features of the Wavell plan, were as follows: 
It was proposed that the Executive Council was to be 
reconstituted and the viceroy was in future to make 
recommendation for appointment to his executive from amongst 
leaders of Indian political life at the centre and in the 
provinces, in such proprtions which would give a balanced 
representation to the main communities, including equal 
proportions of Muslims and Caste-Hindus. 
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In order to pursue this object, the viceroy would call 
in to conference a number of leading Indian politicians who 
were the heads of the most important parties or who had 
recent experience as prime Ministers of provinces, together 
with a few others of special experience and authority. The 
viceroy was to put before this conferefne the proposal that 
the Executive Council was to be constituted as stated above 
and to invite from the members of the conference a list of 
names. Out of these he had to choose the future members of 
his Executive Council, although the responsibility for the 
recommendations was, of course, to continue to rest with 
him, and his freedom of choice, therefore, remained 
unrestricted. 
The members of his council who were chosen as a result 
of this arrangement had to whole-heartedly co-operate in 
supporting and carrying through the war against Japan to 
its victorious conclusion. 
The members of the Executive would be Indians with the 
exception of the viceroy and the commander-in-chief, who 
would retain his position as war member. This was essential 
so long as the defence of India remained a British 
responsibility. Nothing contained in any of these proposals 
would affect the relations of the Crown with the Indian 
states, through the viceroy as crown representative. 
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The success of such a plan depended upon its acceptance 
in India and the degree to which responsible Indian 
politicians were prepared to co-operate with the object of 
making it a workable interim arrangement. In the absence of 
such general acceptance existing arrangements were to 
continue. 
If such co-operation could be achieved at the centre. 
It was no doubt to be reflected in the provinces to enable 
responsible Governments to be set up, once again in those 
provinces. It was to be hoped that in all the provinces 
these Governments would be based on the participation of .all 
the main parties, thus patching up communal differences and 
allowing ministeries to concentration their administrative 
tasks. 
Lord Wavell in his Broad-cast on June 14, 1945,^^ 
explained the functions of the new Executive and made a 
reference to those who were invited to attend a conference 
at Simla. Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah as the recognised 
leaders of the two main political parties. Rao Bahadur N. 
Shiva Raj to represent the scheduled classes. Master Tara 
Singh to represent the Sikhs. 
"Invitations to those gentlemen are being handed to 
them today, and it is proposed to assemble the conference on 
25th June at Simla - - - -. 
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If the meeting is successful, I hope that we shall be 
able to agree on the formation of the new Executive council 
at the centre. I also hope that it will be p9ssible for 
Ministeries to ressume office and again undertake the task 
of government in the provinces now administered under 
Sections 93 of the constitution Act and these Ministeries 
will be coalition.^^ 
The conference began in Simla on the appointed date. 
Each party and group was then asked to submit separately 
a list from which the Governor-General would prepare his own 
list. All the lists had been submitted^^ when the 
conference adjourned till 14th July. 
Unfortunately Lord Wavell could not accept any list. 
So, on 14th July, 1945, the viceroy wound up the conference 
by declaring a failure of the talks.-^ ^ The difference 
between congress and the league arose over the mode of 
Muslim representation. The responsibility for the failure 
lies partly on Lord Wavell and partly on Indian leaders. 
According to Mr. Jinnah the Wavell plan was a 'Snare' 
"There was the combination consisting of Gandhi Hindu 
congress who stand for India's Hindu National independence 
as one India, and the Latest exponent of geographical unity, 
Lord Wavell creating a disputes among the musalmans in the 
Punjab. We are sought to be pushed into this arrangement. 
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by which, if we had agred to, as proposed by Lord Wavell we 
should have signed our death warrant. "-^ ^ 
"Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the then Congress President, 
who attended the Simla conference, as a leader of the 
congress, made the following statement at the Press 
conference on July 14, 1945, He said that the congress was 
prepared to accommodate the Muslim League consistently with 
its national policy. Failure of the conference, he added, 
was due to the uncompromising attitude taken by the 
league. "-^ ^ 
As a result of Wavell's policy of the gradual release 
of congressmen from prison, there had been an increase of 
congress Muslim members in the provincial asemblies. This 
in turn had led to the defeat of the league ministries in 
Assam, Bengal, Sind and the North West frontier province. 
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CABINET MISSION 
The failure of the wavell plan created a sense of 
frustration in India. However, a hopeful situation was 
created by the labour party, sympathetic to Indian National 
Congress coining to power in Britain. On 19th February 1946 
Prime Minister Attlee announced that he was sending a 
special team of three cabinet ministers to India to find out 
in consultation with the viceroy and the Indian leaders, an 
agreed on constitution of India. This was the first time in 
India. It seemed that the labour government meant business. 
The three ministers sent were Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 
Secretary of State for India; Sir Stafford Cripps, President 
of the Board of Trade; and A.V. Alexander, first Lord of the 
Admiralty. Cripps with a brilliant mind was a great expert 
in Indian affairs and in the formulation of plans. The 
mission reached New DEelhi on 24th March, 1946. 
The cabinet mission though met the leaders of all 
communities, but more with the representatives of the 
Congress and the Muslim League, the former headed by Azad, 
and the latter by Jinnah. Jihah emphatically demanded 
Pakistan consisting of six Muslim provinces. The mission was 
refused to concede Jinnah's demand, and pointed out that 
Pakistan would include many Hindu districts which in 
principle should belong to India. The mission told Jinnah 
that Pakistan must be smaller than he what he had conceived. 
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East Punjab, West Bengal including Calcutta, and Assam must 
not be included in Pakistan because there were Hindu 
majority areas. Thus the alternatives put before Jinnah 
were: (1) either to accept a smaller Pakistan with full 
sovereignty or a larger Pakistan constituting one federal 
unit) within an Indian union and with less sovereign powers. 
Jinnah refused a 'moth-eaten Pakistan*. He was not prepared 
to lose Calcutta. But finding the cabinet mission against 
partition Jinnah modified his demand and was prepared to 
accept a 'large Pakistan' within an Indian union. 
Now task before the cabinet mission was to frame out a 
structure mid-way between a strong united India and an 
independent Pakistan. 
The venue of the negotiations was shifted from Delhi to 
Simla. After a week's futile struggle at Simla, frSom 5 to 
12 May, the mission decided to put forward its own plan. 
On 16 May the mission published its plan and rejected 
the division of the country. ^'^ The plan envisaged a Union 
of India, (both British , India and the Indian states) which 
should conduct foreign affairs, defence, and communications. 
The Union was to have an executive and a legislature. All 
subjects other than the above three and all residury power, 
were given to the provinces. The provinces were grouped into 
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three sections: section A was to consist of the six Hindu-
majority provinces; section B was to consist of the two 
Muslim provinces; and similarly section C was to consist of 
two Muslims majority provinces. Their legislatures were to 
be elected by each provincial legislative assembly was fixed 
in the scheme. ^  
Province 
Madras 
Bombay 
U.P. 
Bihar 
Orissa 
C.P. 
Province 
Punjab 
N.W.F.P. 
Sind 
9 22 
General 
45 
19 
47 
31 
9 
16 
167 
General 
8 
0 
1 
! 4 
Section 
Section 
A 
B 
Musi 
4 
2 
8 
5 
0 
1 
20 
Muslim 
16 
3 
3 
35 
im 
Sikh 
4 
0 
0 
Total 
49 
21 
55 
36 
9 
17 
187 
General 
28 
3 
4 
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Section C 
Province General Muslim Total 
Bengal 27 33 60 
Assam ' 7 3 10 
34 36 70 
The representatives of the provinces in each section 
were first to meet separately, in three constitution of the 
provinces in each section. Then the legislators of all the 
provinces were to meet together with the representatives of 
the Indian states, to frame a constitution for the union of 
India a three-tier. The plan in essence provided for 
governmental system. A province could opt out of a section 
if the people of the province so desired but only after the 
new constitutions had been enforced. In the meantime .the 
Government of India was to be carried on by an interim 
government of the Indian political parties. 
The cabinet mission's plan was the best that could be 
framed to maintain the unity of India at that critical 
period of history-^ .^ It removed the fears of Muslims by 
grouping them into two solid units, with full autonomy 
except the three subjects which the union government was to 
control. The union government was to have parity between 
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Hindus and Muslims. Jinnah, who was not prepared to budge an 
inch from his stand, was now brought round to accept an 
Indian union. The success of the plan depended on its 
acceptance in good faith by both the congress and the League 
and also on mutual trust. 
The Congress president Azad, a Muslim himself, was 
perhaps the only one in the Congress High Command who knew 
of the fears and of the Indian Muslims. At the same time, 
Azad rightly believed that the division of India would solve 
the communal tangle. He considered that in future political 
parties would be contesting not on religious but economic 
and political issues. The cabinet mission plan, therefore, 
was to his own liking. But Azad, could not pull the whole 
force of congress behind him. He did not approve the 
compulsory grouping of the provinces. While congress was 
deliating the mission's long-term plan, a new dispute arose 
on the composition of the interim government. On 16th of 
June the cabinet mission and the Governor-General declared 
that the interim government woulde have fourteen persons, 
six belonging to congress, five to the Muslim League, one 
Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsi. Although Congress 
was opposed in principle to the League being given almost 
equality with the Congress, it was ready to accept the offer 
on condition that it would also nominate a Congress Muslim 
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on cabinet from its own quota. Jinnah, opposed it in 
principle. 
Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence were worried, the more so 
because on 6th June Jinnah had accepted the both the 
cabinet mission's plan and the proposals about interim 
government. If congress rejected the plan, viceroy would 
have to ask the League to form a government without 
congress. This point was impressed upon Patel in a private 
meeting with the cabinet Mission on 23 June"^ .^ Patel was 
willing to bring round the congress working committee to 
accept the mission's long-term plan provided the proposals 
for the interim government were put in abeyance. The cabinet 
ministers accepted patel's proposal. Patel exercised his 
influence and the congress working committee accepted the 
mission's long term plan on 25 June and rejected. As both 
parties had accepted the long-term plan, the mission hoped 
that both parties would now go ahead to implement it. The 
cabinet mission lefty India on 29th June. The secret 
agreement between the mission and congress concerning the 
scrapping of the interim government proposals, aroused 
suspicions and Jinnah accused the viceroy and the mission of 
the League to form the interim government. 
On 7th July the All-India Congress Committee met at 
Bombay and Nehru took over the congress presidency from 
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Azad. On that day the congress socialists attacked the 
cabinet mission plan. They calling it a trap laid by British 
imperialists, and asked the congress committee to reject it. 
Nehru, chose to make an equally fiery and provocative speech 
which turned out to be one of the most serious tactical 
errors of nis political life"^ .^ He declared that congress 
was not bound by the mission's plan "except that we have 
decided to go to the constituent Assembly'. "^^ Three days 
later, in a press conference on 10 July, Nehru said that in 
all probability there would be no grouping of provinces 
because Assam and the North-West frontier province would 
decide against it. Nehru's statement reflected the confusion 
and uncertainty of the congressmen. It should have either 
rejected the plan or accepted it. It turned out, to be the 
last opportunity to keep India united. 
Jinnah quickly condemned congress for its "pettifogging 
and higgling attitude'. He lamented that congress had shown 
no appreciation of the League sacrifice in accepting the 
unity of India under the mission's plan. The League in the 
circumstances had no alternative but to adhere once more to 
the national goal of Pakistan^ ^^ . He called upon the council 
of the All-India Muslim League to reject the cabinet mission 
plan. On 28 July the Council rejected the plan without a 
single dissentient. Jinnah fixed 16 August as "dir-ect 
action' day and called on all members of the League to 
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renounce government titles. On that day Jinnah declared a 
"war* against the British government and congress. 
What we have done today is the most historic act in our 
history. Never have we in the whole history of the League 
done anything except by constitutional methods and by 
constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into 
this position. This day we bid goodbye to constitutional 
methods.^ 
A last attempt to an agreement between congress and the 
League was made by Attlee. In the first week of December he 
invited among others, Nehru and Jinnah, to London but the 
conference failed. Nehru returned to Delhi determined to go 
ahead with the constituent assembly even without the League 
participation. Jinnah resolved to take have Pakistan. .The 
League boycotted the Constituent Assembly which opened on 
December 9, 1946. 
Lord Mountbatten succeeded Lord Wavell as viceroy on 22 
March, 1947. On 8th March the congress working committee 
demanded a partition of Punjab and Bengal. In this way the 
foundation for India's partition was laid before 
Mountbatten's arrival on 22 March 1947. 
On June 3rd Mountbatten uncovered the British plan to 
m 
transfer power to the two dominions of India and Pakistan on 
August 15, 1947. This included the partition of the Bengal 
and Punjab. On Julyt 18, 1947, the British parliament passed 
the Independence of India Act of 1947, which set up in India 
two Independent Dominions - India and Pakistan. Thus 15 
August, 1947 marked the beginning of the end of British 
empires. 
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CONCLUSION: 
Since specific conclusions pertaining to the subject 
matter of this work have already figured in their 
appropriate context in the prece ding chapters, the present 
attempts to present some generalizations on the basis of an 
overall survey and review of the theme of this work. 
India has been a classic plural society since 5000 
yeg]^. Accounts are available of the ancient Indian Vajjian 
confederacy and the Vaisali federal arrangement of the 
Licchavi tribes, with the republican constitution.•'• 
The story of federalism in Indian subcontinent is 
unique. India is peculiar in a number of ways: in area,, in 
population (size and density), in diversity of terrain 
climate, culture, and political experience. In ancient India 
there was a federal type arrangement. During Aryans, Hans, 
Sakas, Scythians, the contry had never been under a single 
unified authority. During that time village was the primary 
unit of administration. It enjoyed local freedom under an 
elected Sarpanch who was elected by all adults.^ 
Stable administration in the Mughal Empire was also 
fedral in structure estabished with special focus on subahs. 
The structure of the Mughal administration, comprised at the 
apex of subahs (provinces); consisting of sarkars (little 
bigger then the latter day Districts); and Parganas 
(Precursor of the Tehsils); or Mahals (comprising many 
villages) of terrain, climate, culture and political 
exprience.^ On their withdrawal the British tried hard to 
establish a single federation for the wholes of sub-
continent. They felt that a federation of the whole would be 
the best way of reducing the impact of those diversities. In 
India diversity was itself a concept of federalism. 
The transformation in the 18th century of the British 
East India Company into a soveriegn authority was marked by 
the emergence of independent governmental organisations at 
the three centers - Calcutta, Madras and Bombay - owing 
common allegiance to one supreme authoity in England. The 
regulating act of 1773 attempted to initiate the process of 
centralization by creating the office of the Goveraor-
General and empowering his Executive Council to legislate 
for the good order. It was only under the Act of 1833 that a 
full Statured central govt overriding local autonomy and 
possessing exclusive powers to make laws, raise finance and 
govern the country was created. In 1861 was taken the first 
step in the sphere of legislative decentralization and in 
1870 came Lord Mayo's measures relating to financial 
devolution. 
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The policy of decentralizatin which had been initated 
after 1861 for the reasons of organised and effective 
nationalism. The change in British policy had been primarily 
brought about by the emergence of a mass national movement 
which had gained great momentum not only in the context of 
the conditions created by the First World War but also from 
less tangible factors like the expansion of western 
education, development of scientific means of 
communications. These factors hastened the pace of political 
socialization in India.^ 
With the advent of Gandhiji and M.A. Jinnah on the 
Indian political scene commenced a period of charismatic 
leadership. By providing a model for a new way of life and 
by touching deep-seated psychological traits in a way which 
provoked a wide spread response. 
Mr. Mantague and Lord Chelmsford, for the first time, 
mentioned the future form of the Indian constitution for the 
whole of India including states. They wrote :"Looking ahead 
to the future we can picture India to ourselves only as 
presenting the external semblance of some form Federation. 
The provinces will ultimately become self-governing units, 
held together by the central government, which will deal 
solely with matters of common concern to all of them. But 
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the matters coininon to the British province are also to a 
great extent those in which the Native States are interested 
- defence, tariffs, exchange, opium, salt, railways, posts 
and telegraphs. The gradual concentration of the govt* of 
India upon such matter will therefore make it easier for the 
states, while retaining the autonomy which they cherish in -
internal matters, to enter into closer association with the 
central govt, if they wish to do so. But, though we have no 
hesitation in forecasting such a development as possible, 
the last thing that we desire is to attempt to force the 
pace. Influences are at work which need no artificial 
stimulation. All that we need or can do is to open the door 
to the natural developments of the future.^ It was on this 
future picture that they based their proposal for 
introducing reforms in the govt of British India. 
The reforms of 1919 undoubtedly encouraged the spirit 
of local freedom in all provinces, at least in all those 
functions of govt which had been classified as provincial. 
Simon Commission completed its report which was 
published in 1930. Its proposals had been based upon a 
federal constitution for India. As proposed establishment of 
an Indian federation in which each province should, as far 
as possible, the mistress in her own house." It also 
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suggested that the central legislature should be recognized 
on a federal pattern and recommended that the lower house, 
to be known as the federal assembly, should be indirectly 
elected by provincial legislature. 
Simon Commission suggested that full responsibility 
should replace dyarchy and that all departments of 
provincial administration should be placed in the hands of 
single ministry responsible to the legislature. However, 
Commission was boycotted and its proposal & suggestion were 
rejected by the Indians. 
The Nehru Committee proposals have been largely based 
upon a federal constitution for India. This is very well 
illustrated by two of their proposals. With regard 
to the provoncial legislature they recommended; " The 
legislature power of a province shall be vested in the king 
and the local legislative council.".^ And as the provincial 
executive was recommended to be responsible solely to the 
provincial legislature, the provincial governments were 
contemplated to be fully independent in there sphere of 
administration. 
They also recommended the creation of a supreme court 
for India, which among other matters, was to be given 
original jurisdiction in all matters arising between the 
6 
provinces, and it was also to interpret the constitution. 
Both these attributes are conunon to the supreme courts of 
all federations. Dealing with the problem of the Indian 
States the Committee definitely committed themselves to .the 
federal type of constitution for India. They wrote :"But if 
the constitution of India is to be a federal one, as we 
think it might well be, the position of the Indian States in 
relation to that federation appears to us to call for a 
definite determination and the ideas on the subject require 
to be cleared up".^ 
An almost similar ideas runs throughout the 
supplementary report of the enlarged Nehru Committee who 
stressing the point that, there has been a tendency towards 
a compromise between federal and unitary type of 
constitution, they say,"In drawing up our proposal we have 
deliberately declined to be overborne by one type or the 
other. We have born in mind the peculiar position of India 
and have provided for the development of the fullest 
possible provincial compatibly with national interests. we 
have kept before us the peculiar problem of minorities in 
various provinces which, in our opinion, necessitates the 
reservation of a certain measure of interference, in cases 
of grave emergency, on the part of the central government. 
The limits we have provided for provincial activities and 
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functions are very wide, and within these limits provincial 
governments will be masters within their own houses, free 
from the control of the central government. It is obvious, 
however, that there is very large field of state activity 
which, in any system of stable administration, must be 
covered exclusively by the central government which alone 
can safeguard national interests and reconcile conflicting 
claims between province and province. It is from this point 
of view that ve have approached our task and we are happy to 
be able to say that the vast majority of those of our 
country men who have thought over the matter have expressed 
their approval of the line adopted by us."^° 
As regards the attitude of the communal parties towards 
the proposed federal form of government for India, the Hindu 
Mahasabha accepted the proposals ^^and recommendations of 
the Nehru Committee, i.e. they favoured the retention of 
residury powers in the central government, which they 
wished, should also be responsible for peace and good 
government throughout the commonwealth. And as the Hindus 
are the largest community in India, this meant that through 
the instrumentality of the central government the Hindu 
majority could largely influence provincial governments even 
in the provinces with Muslim majorities. This was 
unacceptable to the Muslims who, in their All India 
Conference held at Delhi on January 1, 1929, stated in their 
main resolution: Whereas, in view of India's vast extent 
and its ethnological, linguistic, administrative and 
geographical or territorial divisions the only form of 
Government suitable to Indian conditions is a federal system 
with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the 
constituent states, the central Government having control 
only of such matters of common interest as may be 
specifically entrusted to it by the constitution; "This 
conference emphatically declares that no constitution,- by 
whomsoever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian 
moslems unless it conforms with the principles embodied in 
this resolution. "-^ ^ 
By giving large as well as residury powers to the 
provinces they hoped to give the Muslim majority in North-
west Frontier province, Baluchistan, sind, Pujab, and Bengal 
Virtually full control in the governments of these 
provinces. And it was mainly this desire for the exercise 
of power in provincial administration, which dictated to 
them the necessity of demanding the separation of sind from 
Bombay and its constitution into province, and equal status 
for the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan with the other 
provinces. Also for this very reason they wanted the Muslim 
minorities in other provinces to elect their own 
representatives in excess of their population proportion so 
9 
as to be able to exercise sufficient check in those 
provinces. 
Similar views were expressed by Mr. Jinnah on behalf of 
his section of the Muslim League in the Calcutta Convention, 
although he guarded his words by saying that his proposal 
was not based upon communal aspect. He said: "OuX next 
proposal is that the form of the constitution should be 
federal with residuary powers vesting in the provinces and 
clause 13-A, in the supplementary Nehru Report is most 
pernicious and should be deleted and the whole constitution 
should be revised on the basis of provincial Governments 
having the residuary powers vested in them This 
question is by for the most important from the 
constitutional point of view and the future development of 
I T . 
India has very little to do with communal aspect. "•^-' Sir Tej 
Bahadur Sapru, speaking upon this amendment of Mr. Jinnah, 
Warned the members that they should take lesson from what 
was happening in the United States of America and Australia, 
where the state Governments had the residuary powers 
assigned to themselves, but they were now realising this 
mistake of their forefathers. He said, having regard to the 
peculiar position of India it would be unwise to vest these 
powers in the provinces. The constitution we have devised 
is neither federal nor unitary. It is both. 
I'd 
As regards the opinion of the Indian princes about the 
federal form of constitution for India and the position of 
the states therein, they have definitely accepted the 
proposal for an Indian federation with an honouralDle 
position for the States inside it, commensurate with the 
provisions of their treaties, Sanads and engagements. This 
was made perfectly clear by the Maharajah of Patiala in his 
address on the topic 'Indian States and the Crown* delivered 
by him at the East India Association, London, on July 28th 
1928. He said "I think it is fair to say that we are all 
agreed that there must be something like a federation for 
India; and by federation I mean nothing more than a 
machinery which will enable British India and Indian India 
to meet together at the top, and to discuss Jointly, in a 
manner consonant with the interests and importance of each, 
all policies and proposals which affect India as a whole."•'•^  
All the princes and other delegates of the states at the 
Round Table conference accepted the principle of an all 
India federation. But the only point on which they laid 
emphasis was that they should be treated on terms of 
equality with British India and not made subordinate to it, 
and that this consummation be brought about by a willing 
cooperation of the states and be not forced upon them by co-
ercion. 
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The final resolution of the Round Table conference has, 
however, settled the question and there is now no doubt 
about the practicability of establishing such a federation. 
Mr. Jinnah who did not agree to Nehru Report which was 
based on absolute power, put forward his Fourteen points in 
1929. Fourteen points were nothing but a federal plan .for 
future India. This is very well illustrated by these 
proposals. With regard to the provincial government they 
recommended: every province should enjoy uniform measure of 
autonomy; the form of any constitution to be drawn for free 
India should be federal with the residuary powers vested in 
the provincial government. 
The Government of India Act of 1935 marked a second 
mile stone in the road to full federal government in India. 
This new Act suggested to form a federation consisting of 
the British India and Indian States; autonomy to the 
provinces and dyarchy at the centre. The provinces for "the 
first time got a measure of responsible government. The 
system of dyarchy or the division of subjects into Reserved 
transferred was done away with. The hold of the centre over 
the provincial subject was also considerably reduced. The 
Government of India Act of 1935 nade provision for the 
establishment of High Court and provincial service cadres in 
each province. 
u 
The relationship between the centre and the provinces 
was regulated on federal times. The Government of India 
Act, 1935 divided the administrative matters into three 
categories. The federal list contained 59 subjects and 
right to make laws on these was given to the federal 
legislature. The provincial list comprised 54 subjects 
with which provincial governments could deal without the 
interference of the centre under normal conditions. The 
concurrent list enumerated 36 subjects with which both the 
centre and the provinces were competent to deal. 
The Act of 1935 was brought only partly into operation, 
part first which concerned the provinces was enforced and 
the provinces received responsible governments. But part 
second or the federal part of the Government of India Act of 
1935 could not be introduced because of bitter criticism 
that it met within the country. 
The federal structure of 193 5 profoundly influenced 
India's choice of constitution after freedom, and led to 
adoption, by the constituent assembly, of a co-operative 
federation, with a strong central government. In effect, 
therefore, the 1935 scheme of the divisions of power between 
the centre and units came to be generally adopted by the 
constitution of India. 
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Cripps arrived in Delhi on March 22, 1942. He 
iininid lately went into consultation with viceroy and his 
Executive Council. Thereafter he started his negotiation 
with the leaders of Indian parties and gave the impression 
that he had brought definite proposals to make a final 
settlement on a federal line. 
The proposals fell into two parts. The first, dealing 
with long range arrangements contained the following points, 
(1) Creation of a new Indian Union which would have full 
status of a Dominion with the power to secede, if it chose 
from the British commonwealth; (2) For this purpose, all 
members of the lower houses of the provincial legislature 
would meet as a single electoral college and choose 
representatives equal to one-tenth of its own number Seats 
were fixed for communities on the basis of their population. 
As far as the princely states, they could appoint their 
representatives in proportion on the basis of their 
population. (3) The British Government undertook to accept 
and forthwith implement the constitution framed by this body 
subject to certain conditions. 
The plan offered that, immidiately after the war 
Britain would set up an elected, constitution-making body 
which would frame a federal constitution for the Indian 
u 
Union, But if any province did not want to joint the 
federation it could frame its own constitution and exist as 
an independent state. The cripps formula was rejected by 
every section of Indian opinion. 
In October, 1943, Lord Linlithgow's term as Governor-
General had ended and Lord Wavell had occupied the 
Government House. Soon after his installation, he had 
declared that he was bringing a number of things in his hand 
bag and hinted vaguely at a solution for the communal 
problem. 
Wavell offer did not deal with the long range problem 
of Indian independence. Its scope was limited to the 
present and its proposals were interim proposals like the 
Cripps offer. The main point was the determination of -the 
personnel of the reconstituted Executive Council. To start 
with, all parties, including the congress accepted the 
Wavell scheme in principle and Lord Wavell called a 
conference of 22 Indian leaders at Simla. The conference 
opened on 29th June on a hopeful note but soon 'a divergence 
leapt into the forefront of the picture. The congress had 
accepted the provision regarding Hindu-Muslim party, but Mr. 
Jinnah insisted that only the Muslim League should have the 
right to nominate Muslim members of the Executive Council. 
The Congress resisted this claim because its aceptance would 
id 
reduce it to the position of a purely Hindu organisation and 
deny its national character. 
On the rock of this intransigenence, the conference 
failed. Lord WavelX. announced its breakdown on July 14. 
Thus ended another effort to break the constitutional 
deadlock. 
In 1945, the Labour Party came to power in Britain and 
forthwith decided upon a fresh approach towards the Indian 
problem. General elections to the central and provincial 
legislature in India produced significant results. The 
Muslim League which fought the elections captured 446 out of 
495 Muslim seats, failing only in N.W.F.P. Clearly, it had 
the support of the bulk of the muslim community. 
Early in 194 6, the Labour Prime Minister Atlee made two 
important statements recognising India's right to 
independence and declaring that a minority could nou. be 
allowed to veto the political progress of the majority. ^-^  
Shortly afterwards, the cabinet Mission visited India in 
order to resolve the political deadlock. 
The spring of 1946 marked the beginning of the final 
phase in the settlement of the Indian constitutional and 
communal deadlock. The cabinet mission arrived in India on 
23rd March, 1946. on May 5, the Mission began a conference 
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with four representatives each of the congress and the 
Muslim league to discuss federal solution for future Indian 
constitution. In its plan, the Mission rejected the demand 
for Pakistan and proposed the establishment of a constituent 
Assembly to frame a three-tyre constitution for the union of 
India. Both Muslim League and Congress accepted the Cabinet 
Mission plan and also the proposals about interim 
government. on 7 July the All India Congress Conmittee met 
in Bombay, it was at this meeting that Nehru took ever .the 
presidentship of the Congress from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. 
on that day the Congress attacked the Cabinet mission plan 
under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. In a press 
conference on 10th July, Nehru said there would be no 
compulsory grouping of provinces as the plan had suggested 
earlier. Jinnah quickly reacted to Nehru's statemtnt. He 
condemned congress for its malafide intentions. Ultimately 
he called upon the council of the All India Muslin League to 
reject the Cabinet Mission plan. 
On February 20, 1947, the British Government announced 
its momentous decision to withdraw from India by June 1943. 
In March, 1947, Lord Wavell was replace by Lord Mountbatten. 
The latter drew up a plan for India' s partition and the 
establishment of two separate Dominions, India and Pakistan. 
In view of the growing chaos in the country, the congress 
bowed to the inevitable and accepted partition as a 
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necessary evil. On August 15, 1947, partition was effected 
in accordance to the terms of the Mountbatten Award of June 
3 and India and Pakistan emerged as soverign states amidst a 
holocaust of bloodshed, arson and abduction unprecendent for 
its barbarity and magnitude in the history of the world. 
In all these proposal we find there was a concensus 
among all the political parties that India should be a 
federal state, but it was divided because of the emphasis on 
centralisation by Congress and Hindu Mahasabha. The Muslims 
also wanted an all India federation of the sub-continent but 
with more powers for the provinces and greatest possible 
autonomy for them. Their apprehension was that strong 
central government might crush their autonomy with 
interference in day to day business of government. It was 
on this question of centralisation that the partition of the 
country took place. Had congress conceded Muslim League 
demand of a decentratized federation, with minimum but 
necessary power for the centre, the country would not have 
been partitioned. 
However, with the advent of freedom India became free 
to make a federal constitution of the choise of its leaders. 
The congress majority in the constituent Assembly gave us a 
constitution in which centre was overburdened with powers, 
so much so that now it has to take the rasponsibility for 
everything which happens in any state. 
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